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SUPREME COURT § 1983 DECISIONS-OCTOBER 2008
TERM
MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ*
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code is a vital part of American law.
This statute authorizes private parties to enforce their federal constitutional rights, and
some federal statutory rights, against defendants who acted under color of state law.1
These defendants include state and local officials sued in their personal capacities and
municipalities and other municipal entities.2 The statute is commonly referred to as
"§ 1983" and claims asserted under it are referred to as "§ 1983 claims".
The fact that a § 1983 plaintiff establishes that the defendant violated her federally
protected rights does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff will obtain relief. There are
numerous defenses available to § 1983 claims, including absolute and qualified
immunity. Furthermore, there is no vicarious liability under § 1983.3 Thus, municipal
entities 4 and supervisory officials 5 may not be held liable on the basis of respondeat
superior liability, but only for the particular defendant's own wrongs.6
Last term's decision in Safford Unified School District No. I v. Redding7 illustrates
how immunity and other defenses may thwart a plaintiffs ability to obtain relief despite
prevailing on the constitutional merits. The Court in Redding agreed with the plaintiff
* The author expresses appreciation for the valuable assistance of Laura Aviles and Robin Daleo, students
at Touro Law Center, in the preparation of this article.
1. Section 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
2. States and state agencies are not suable "persons" under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dept. of St. Police, 491
U.S. 58, 66 (1989). However, a state official sued in an official capacity is a § 1983 "person" when sued for
prospective relief. Id at 71 n. 10.
3. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); accord Ashcroft v. 1qbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009).
4. A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only if "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
5. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
6. See infra pt. IV.
7. 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2009); see also infra pt. III(B).
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that the school official's strip search of 13-year old Savana Redding violated the Fourth
Amendment, yet held that the defendant officials were protected from monetary liability
by qualified immunity because the Fourth Amendment law was not clearly established
when the search occurred. The Court remanded plaintiffs municipal liability claim
against the School District; plaintiffs ability to recover on that claim will depend on
whether plaintiff can establish that the search was conducted pursuant to a municipal
policy or practice. This typically presents a formidable burden for § 1983 plaintiffs and,
if the Redding plaintiffs cannot satisfy it, they will not obtain any relief.9
During the October 2008 term, the Supreme Court rendered several decisions
resolving a broad range of important § 1983 issues. These decisions reflect a "mixed
bag" of pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant rulings. However, in the author's view, on the
whole § 1983 defendants fared decisively better on the most important issues. Plaintiffs
obtained favorable rulings that Title IX does not preclude § 1983 constitutional claims; 10
that a New York law that barred prisoner § 1983 damages claims in state court against
correction officers violated the Supremacy Clause; 1' and that school officials' strip
search of a middle school student violated the Fourteenth Amendment (although the
defendant officials were found protected by qualified immunity because the Fourth
Amendment law was not clearly established at the time of the search).12 On the other
hand, the Court held that the "plausibility" pleading standard governs Bivens and § 1983
federal court complaints and dismissed Bivens1 3 claims for failure to satisfy that
standard, 14 rejected supervisory liability as an independent form of § 1983 and Bivens
liability, 15 held that convicted criminal defendants do not have a due process right to
post-conviction DNA testing,16 and rejected a § 1983 wrongful conviction claim by
extending absolute prosecutorial immunity to supervisory prosecutors who allegedly
failed to train, supervise, and establish information systems concerning exculpatory
impeachment material. 17 The Court, overruling prior precedent, held that when a
defendant invokes qualified immunity, courts have discretion whether to first decide
8. See infra pt. III(B).
9. The interplay of qualified immunity and municipality results in a cost-allocation scheme amongst the
municipality, the individual officer, and the plaintiff whose federally protected rights were violated. Owen v.
City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980). The Supreme Court, in Owen, explained how the "costs" are
allocated:
1. The municipality will be held liable when the violation of the plaintiffs federally protected right is
attributable to enforcement of a municipal policy or practice.
2. The individual officer will be held liable when she violated plaintiffs clearly established federally
protected right and, therefore, not shielded by qualified immunity.
3. The plaintiff whose federally protected right was violated will not be entitled to monetary recovery and
will "absorb the loss" when the violation of his right is not attributable to a municipal policy or
practice and the individual officer did not violate plaintiffs clearly established federal rights.
See id.
10. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788 (2009); see infra pt. II(A.).
11. Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009); see infra pt. V.
12. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644; see infra pt. III(B).
13. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (when
applicable, the Bivens doctrine authorizes claims against federal officials).
14. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951; see infra pt. I.
15. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948; see infra pt. IV.
16. D.A.'s Off for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322 (2009); see infra pt. II(C).
17. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2009); see infra pt. III(A).
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whether the plaintiff has alleged a meritorious constitutional claim or, alternatively, to
bypass that issue and proceed directly to the qualified immunity issue of whether the
defendant violated clearly established federal law. 18 Although this could be viewed as a
neutral rule of court administration, neither pro-plaintiff nor pro-defendant, it likely tilts
in favor of § 1983 defendants since defendants who assert qualified immunity typically
prefer that the court bypass the constitutional merits and not establish constitutional
norms. 19
My goal here is to analyze last term's decisions that are relevant to § 1983
litigation, placing special emphasis upon their litigation significance. The decisions
discussed are organized as follows:
I. PLEADING § 1983 CLAIMS ......................................... 234
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ENFORCEABLE UNDER SECTION 1983........................239
A. Relationships between Title IX and Section 1983 ....... .. ........ 240
B. Fourth Amendment Rights ....................... ............ 243
1. Student Searches ............................... ...... 244
2. Automobile Searches .................................. 247
C. Right to Post-Conviction DNA Testing ................... ..... 249
III. IMMUNITIES .............................................. ....... 255
A. Prosecutorial Immunity ................................... 255
B. Qualified Immunity.. ...................................... 261
1. "Clearly Established Federal Law"........ ........................ 261
2. Procedural Aspects of Qualifed Immunity ..........................263
a. Pleading Claims Subject to Qualified Immunity ................. 263
b. Qualified Immunity Decision-making Protocol ...... ....... 264
c. Qualified Immunity Appeals . .................. ........ 267
IV. SUPERVISORY LIABILITY ..................................... .......269
V. STATE COURT § 1983 DAMAGES ACTIONS AGAINST CORRECTION OFFICERS.....271
Before analyzing the decisions, a prefatory point is in order. One of the Court's
most important decisions of the past term for § 1983 litigators was Ashcroft v. Iqbal.20
Because the complaint in that case asserted claims against federal officials, the claims
were not asserted against defendants who acted under color of state law and, therefore,
the claims were not asserted under § 1983 but pursuant to the Bivens doctrine.2 1 Bivens
is a judicially-created doctrine which allows claims for damages against federal officials.
The Supreme Court in Iqbal treated the various issues before the Court, namely,
complaint pleadings requirements, supervisory liability, and qualified immunity, in a
18. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009); see infra pt. 1(B).
19. See infra pt. II(B).
20. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937.
21. See Bivens,403 U.S. 388.
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manner that made clear that they should be decided in the same manner for both § 1983
and Bivens22 claims. At the same time, it is worth pointing out that the Court expressly
articulated its negative attitude towards Bivens claims. As the Court in Iqbal stated:
"Because implied causes of action are disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend
Bivens liability 'to any new context or new category of defendant.' "23
I. PLEADING § 1983 CLAIMS
The Supreme Court in Iqbal, in an opinion by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, held
that the newly minted "plausibility" pleading standard for federal court complaints
adopted in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly24 applies to all civil complaints filed in
federal court, thus including complaints filed under § 1983 and under Bivens.25 This
holding resolves a major pleadings issue for § 1983 litigators. Although the justices
divided 5-4 on whether the complaint satisfied the Twombly standard, no justice took
issue with the applicability of Twombly to civil rights complaints. The decision will
make it much more difficult for § 1983 plaintiffs to satisfy complaint pleading
requirements. It has been widely touted as one of the most significant, if not the most
significant, decisions of the term.26
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that a federal court complaint must
set forth "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and
(3) a demand for the relief sought." In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit,27 the Supreme Court in 1993 held that § 1983
municipal liability claims are governed by Rule 8's generally applicable pleading
standard, which requires only that the complaint give the defendant fair notice of the
plaintiffs claim and its grounds. Relying upon the plain language of Rules 8 and 9
(which requires that certain issues, e.g., fraud and mistake, be pleaded "with
particularity"), the Court in Leatherman rejected defendant's argument that § 1983
municipal liability claims should be governed by a heightened pleading standard. 28
The Court's decision in Twombly, an antitrust case decided in 2007, generated
considerable uncertainty and confusion over the pleading standards for all federal court
complaints, including those filed under § 1983. The Court in Twombly ruled that
although Rule 8(a)(2) does not require "detailed factual allegations," the complaint must
provide some factual allegations of the nature of the claim and the grounds on which the
22. The Supreme Court has generally treated § 1983 claims and Bivens claims as the same with respect to
qualified immunity. See e.g. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 n. 2 (1986).
23. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (quoting Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)).
24. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
25. 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (pt. IV(A)).
26. See Adam Liptak, Case about 9/11 Could Lead to Broad Shifi on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. Times 10 (July
21, 2009).
27. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
28. Id. at 168. The Court in Leatherman left open whether a heightened pleading rule governs § 1983
personal-capacity claims subject to qualified immunity. See infra pt. ll(B)(1). Relying in part upon
Leatherman, the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), held that notice pleading
governs Title VII and ADEA employment discrimination claims. Id. at 515.
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claim rests.29 The plaintiff must plead "more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." 30 The Court stated
that the "[fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level" to a "plausibility" level.31 Significantly, the Court found that the
district court's ability to limit discovery did not justify relaxation of plaintiffs pleading
obligation. The Court stated:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if
groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through "careful case
management," given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side."3 2
This concern with "discovery gone wild" may well have been the critical driving force
behind the Supreme Court's ratcheting up of federal court civil complaint pleading
standards.
Along the way, the Court in Twombly also ruled that federal courts should no
longer rely on the frequently quoted statement from Conley v. Gibson:3 3
". . . that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief." . . . [A]fter puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous
observation has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately,
it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.34
The Court did not explain what was puzzling about the Conley v. Gibson rule, but
nevertheless unceremoniously retired it. Although Twombly could be read as imposing
some form of "heightened" pleading requirement, the Supreme Court disavowed any
intent to do so. 35 The Court acknowledged that "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations" and that it was not requiring
"heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face." 36 Furthermore, the Court in Twombly did not purport to modify
its earlier decision in Leatherman.37 In fact, just two weeks after its decision in
Twombly, the Court, in Erickson v. Pardus,38 applied notice pleading to a pro se
prisoner's § 1983 Eighth Amendment medical treatment claim and found that the
29. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
3 0. Id.
31. Id.; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.) ("The plausibility standard is not akin
to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.").
32. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635, 638
(1989)).
33. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
34. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561, 563 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46).
35. Id. at 570.
36. Id. at 555, 570.
37. Nor did the Court state that it was modifying its decision in Swierkiewicz. See supra n. 28 and
accompanying text.
38. 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
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complaint satisfied Rule 8's notice pleading standard.
It was unclear whether the Twombly plausibility pleading standard was limited to
antitrust cases or whether it was intended to apply to federal court civil complaints
generally, including those asserting civil rights claims. The Court in Iqbal held that
because Twombly was based upon an interpretation of Rule 8, it is not limited to antitrust
cases and, therefore, governs all federal court civil complaints, thus encompassing
§ 1983 and Bivens complaints.
That brings us to the Bivens complaint filed by Javaid Iqbal. "In the wake of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks[,]" the plaintiff, Javaid Iqbal, a citizen of Pakistan
and a Muslim was arrested by FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service Agents
on "charges of fraud in relation to identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the
United States." 39 He asserted constitutional claims for damages against various federal
officials under the Bivens doctrine arising out of his treatment after being designated a
"person of high interest" while detained pending trial at the Administrative Maximum
Special Housing Unit at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New
York. The complaint named numerous federal officers as defendants, ranging "from the
correctional officers who had day-to-day contact with [Iqbal] during the term of his
confinement, to the wardens of the MDC facility, all the way" to the defendants before
the Supreme Court, former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert
Mueller.40
Iqbal's complaint alleged that while detained at MDC, jailers, without justification,
"kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across" his cell,
and also "subjected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches[,]... and refused to let
him and other Muslims pray because there would be [n]o prayers for terrorists [.]" 4 1 The
complaint alleged that defendants Ashcroft and Mueller " . . . knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to harsh conditions of confinement 'as
a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for
no legitimate penological interest' . . ." and that Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of
this invidious policy and Mueller was "instrumental" in adopting and executing it.42
Defendants asserted qualified immunity and moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that it failed to state sufficient allegations of their own involvement in clearly
established unconstitutional conduct. The Court in Iqbal stated that determining whether
a complaint contains factual allegations constituting a plausible claim for relief is a
"context-specific task" requiring application of "judicial experience and common
sense."A3 Furthermore, when complaint allegations establish a plausible claim of
discrimination but there are other "more likely explanations" for defendants' conduct,
the complaint will not satisfy the plausibility standard. 44
In order to evaluate the sufficiency of the complaint allegations against defendants
Ashcroft and Mueller, the Supreme Court had to determine the liability standard for
39. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942-1943.
40. Id. at 1943.
41. Id. at 1944 (citations omitted).
42. Id. (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 1950.
44. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-1952.
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constitutional claims against supervisory officials sued under § 1983 and Bivens.45
Suffice it to say at this point that the Court held that, like any other official sued under
§ 1983 or Bivens, a supervisory official can be held liable only if he or she engaged in
conduct that caused a violation of plainiff's constitutional rights. The Court thus had to
decide whether lqbal's complaint alleged "plausible" claims that Ashcroft and Mueller
acted with an impermissible discriminatory intent. The Court did not consider the
possibility that claims subject to qualified immunity are governed by a "heightened"
pleading standard.46
The majority in Iqbal found that the complaint allegation, namely that defendants
Ashcroft and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
subject" Iqbal to harsh treatment on account of his race and religion, was a mere
"formulaic recitation" of the elements of his claim, and thus too conclusory to meet the
Twombly plausibility standard.47 The Court said that the principle that, on a motion to
dismiss, a court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true applies to factual
allegations but not to legal conclusions. 48 In other words, legal conclusions must be
supported by factual allegations. Of course, whether a complaint asserts sufficient factual
allegations or merely legal conclusions may well be unclear and, as the Court
acknowledged, dependent upon the exercise of legal judgment. The dissent, reviewing
the same complaint as the majority, and applying essentially the same legal standards,
found the complaint allegations sufficient, "neither confined to naked legal conclusions
nor consistent with legal conduct."4 9 In other words, the dissent found that the plaintiff
did allege a plausible claim that the defendants violated a clearly established federal law.
Although plaintiffs allegations were consistent with defendants' "purposefully
designating detainees 'of high interest' because of their race, religion, or national
origin[,] . . . given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this
purpose." 50 The "more likely," more plausible explanation "is that the Nation's top law
enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep
suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects could be
cleared of terrorist activity." 51
Reiterating an important theme articulated in Twombly, the Iqbal majority ruled
that when the sufficiency of complaint allegations are challenged on a motion to dismiss,
it is irrelevant that the district court may be able to carefully control discovery. 52 This is
45. See infra pt. IV.
46. At the oral argument, the Solicitor General represented that defendants were not asking for a heightened
pleading rule. Oral Argument at 11, lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (available at 2008 WL 5168391).
47. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J. dissenting).
48. Id. at 1949 (majority).
49. Id. at1960 (Souter, J. dissenting). Justice Souter's dissent states that the only exception to the principal
"that a court must take the [complaint] allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be[,]" is for
allegations that are "sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the
plaintiffs recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel. That is not what we have here." Id. at 1959. Justice
Souter found Twombly distinguishable on the ground that the conduct alleged, while consistent with an
unlawful antitrust conspiracy, was equally consistent with legitimate business practices. Id. at 1959-1960.
50. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
51. Id. at 1952.
52. Id. at 1953. The Court in Iqbal quoted Twombly's reference to "the common lament that the success of
judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side." Id. (quoting Twombly, 129 S.
2009 237
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especially so when government officials assert qualified immunity, because this
immunity is designed in part to shield officials from the demands of discovery which
divert their time and energy from their official responsibilities. 53 Thus, the fact that the
court of appeals sought to carefully control plaintiffs discovery did not save his
complaint.
The Court in Iqbal also made an important ruling concerning Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), which requires particularity of pleading of "fraud or mistake" but allows
"[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind [to] be alleged
generally." The Court found that Rule 9(b) did not save the plaintiff because it "merely
excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent under an elevated pleading
standard[,]" but does not obviate the requirement of pleading factual allegations
supporting a plausible claim.54 In other words, conclusory allegations of discriminatory
intent will not be accepted as true on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without
supporting factual allegations. 5 5
To summarize, under Iqbal a federal district court faced with a motion must,
applying its judicial experience and common sense:
1. Seperate the factual allegations in the complaint from the conclusions;
2. Determine whether the factual allegations state a plausible, not merely possible,
claim for relief;
3. Consider whether there is a more plausible explanation for defendant's conduct
than that offered by the plaintiff; and
4. In making this determinations, the court should not take into account its ability
to carefully manage discovery.
Senator Arlen Specter has introduced a bill entitled "The 2009 Notice Pleading
Restoration Act,"56 which is designed to overturn Twombly and Iqbal and "unretire" and
reinstate the Conley v. Gibson standard that a "complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."57 Congressman
Specter said that the effect of the Iqbal decision "will no doubt be to deny many
plaintiffs with meritorious claims access to the federal courts and, with it, any legal
Ct. at 559.).
53. Id. (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2007) (Cabranes, J., concurring)) ("The costs of
diversion are only magnified when Government officials are charged with responding to ... 'a national and
international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.' "); but see Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1961-1962 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (trial court "can structure discovery in ways that diminish the risk of
imposing unwarranted burdens upon public officials. . . . A district court, for example, can begin discovery
with lower level government defendants before determining whether a case can be made to allow discovery
related to higher level government officials." (citations omitted)).
54. Id. at 1954.
55. The Court in Iqbal remanded the case to the circuit court to decide in the first instance whether it should
remand to the district court so that plaintiff could "seek leave to amend his deficient complaint." Id. at 1954.
Further, the Court said that it was "important to note" that it was not passing on the sufficiency of the
complaint allegations with respect to the other defendants. Id. at 1952.
56. Pleading Bill Introduced That Would Make It Easier for Plaintifs to Survive Summary Judgment, 78
U.S. L. Week 2090 (Aug. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Pleading Bill Introduced]; David Ingram, Calling Rulings
'Unwelcome Development, 'Spector Aims to Reduce Pleading Standard, N.Y.L.J. 2 (July 27, 2009).
57. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
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redress for their injuries[.]" 5 8
The decision in Iqbal contains an important lesson for § 1983 plaintiff lawyers,
namely, that § 1983 complaints must allege sufficient factual allegations, not mere legal
conclusions. Plaintiffs' lawyers, however, often face a catch-22 predicament: they need
discovery in order to obtain the necessary information to satisfy the plausibility standard,
but are unable to get to the discovery stage because they lack the necessary information
to satisfy the pleading standard. 59 After Iqbal, plaintiffs' attorneys may have to conduct
more extensive investigations prior to filing suit in order to be able to satisfy the
plausibility standard. Moreover, § 1983 plaintiffs' lawyers must keep in mind that claims
against a supervisory official must be supported by factual allegations that the
supervisor's own conduct violated the plaintiff s constitutionally protected rights.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ENFORCEABLE UNDER § 1983
The most fundamental principle of § 1983 law is that § 1983 itself does not
establish or create any rights but authorizes a cause of action to enforce rights created by
either the U.S. Constitution or, in some cases, a federal statute other than § 1983.60 This
principle has tremendous consequences for § 1983 litigators. First and foremost, it means
that whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a federally-protected right depends not
upon an interpretation of § 1983 but upon an interpretation of the particular provision of
the federal Constitution at issue.61 For example, in Graham v. Connor, the Supreme
Court held that a § 1983 claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force in the
course of carrying out an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure depends upon an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, not upon an interpretation of § 1983.62
Constitutional litigators must thus be well versed in the full range of federal
constitutional rights potentially enforceable under § 1983. This, of course, is no mean
feat.
Although § 1983 fulfills the vital function of authorizing individuals to enforce
their federal constitutional rights against state and local officials and municipalities, the
value of § 1983 is greatly dependent upon the extent to which the United States Supreme
Court recognizes individual rights under the federal Constitution. In other words, the
significance of the Court's pro-plaintiff interpretations of § 1983 itself will be greatly
diminished if, at the same time, the Court gives a narrow interpretation to the individual
rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
Last term's decision in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum63 illustrates how the
58. Pleading Bill Introduced, supra n. 56.
59. See Richard D. Bernstein & Frank M. Scaduto, Court Toughens Application of Rule 8 Pleading
Standards for Civil Cases, N.Y.L.J. 3 (July 6, 2009).
60. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-394 (1989); City of
Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608
(1979).
61. Although some federal statutory rights are enforceable under § 1983 (see Martin A. Schwartz, Section
1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses ch. 4 (4th ed., Aspen Publishers 2004)), for convenience purposes, we
will refer to the enforcement of federal constitutional rights under § 1983.
62. 490 U.S. at 392-399. The Court in Graham held that whether the use of force violates the Fourth
Amendment depends upon whether the force used was objectively reasonable. Id.
63. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
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§ 1983 remedy is dependent on the Court's interpretation of the individual rights granted
by the Constitution. The plaintiffs, a religious organization called Summum, sought to
display a monument containing "The Seven Aphorisms of Summum," somewhat akin to
the Ten Commandments, in a city park. The park already had 15 permanent displays, at
least II of which were donated by private groups or individuals, including a Ten
Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles. When the city
denied Summum's request, Summum brought suit against the city under § 1983 alleging
that the city was engaged in content discrimination in a public forum in violation of their
First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected Summum's free speech claim on the
grounds that the City's permanent displays in the park constituted government speech.
When the government is the speaker, a private party does not have the right to complain
under the free speech clause. 64 As the Court put it, "[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts
government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech." 65
Thus, no matter how broadly the Supreme Court might interpret § 1983 itself, the
plaintiff's claim failed because of the Court's interpretation of the free speech clause.
This is not to suggest that Pleasant Grove City was wrongly decided. As the Court
expressly acknowledged, practical considerations played a major role in the Court's
decision because it is "not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked
this freedom" to engage in its own speech free from First Amendment free speech
restraints.66 The essential point is that Summum's § 1983 claim was rejected because of
the Court's interpretation of the Constitution, and not because of an interpretation of
§ 1983.
During the 2009 Term there were Supreme Court decisions in three areas
concerning individual federal constitutional rights that are especially important for
§ 1983 litigation: (A) the relationship between Title IX, which prohibits gender
discrimination in federally funded educational institutions, and § 1983 Equal Protection
Clause gender discrimination claims; (B) Fourth Amendment searches of students and
automobiles; and (C) a criminal defendant's right of access to evidence for the purpose
of post-conviction DNA testing.
A. The Relationship Between Title IX and § 1983 Equal Protection Claims
There is an extensive body of Supreme Court decisional law concerning the
enforcement of federal statutes under § 1983.67 By contrast, there is fairly little Supreme
Court decisional law on whether a federal statute can operate to preclude the assertion of
a federal constitutional claim. In fact, the Supreme Court has held in only one case that a
federal statute precluded the assertion of § 1983 constitutional claims. In Smith v.
Robinson,68 the Supreme Court held that in enacting the Education of the Handicapped
64. Government speech may give rise to claims under the Establishment Clause (see Pleasant Grove City,
129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1141 (Souter, J. concurring)) and under the Equal Protection
Clause (see id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
65. Id. at 1131.
66. Id.
67. See Schwartz, supra n. 61, at ch. 4.
68. 468 U.S. 992, 1030 (1984).
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Act (EHA), 69 Congress intended to preclude the assertion of constitutional claims under
§ 1983 that parallel (i.e., are analogous) to statutory claims assertable under the EHA.
Last term's Supreme Court decision in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee70
makes clear that the Court will "not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude
reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for a substantial equal protection claim," 7 1 or, for that
matter, as a remedy for any constitutional claim.
The plaintiff, Lisa Fitzgerald, and her parents alleged in federal court that Lisa was
the victim of student-on-student sexual harassment. The complaint included claims under
Title IX against the defendant school committee (the school system's governing body)
and under § 1983 for violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause against both
the school committee and the school superintendent. The defendants argued that Title
IX's remedial scheme was sufficiently comprehensive to preclude enforcement of both
Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause under § 1983. Because the circuits were in
conflict over whether Title IX precludes § 1983 equal protection gender discrimination
claims,72 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits gender discrimination in
federally funded educational institutions. Title IX's only express remedy is an
administrative procedure that can result in the withdrawal of federal funds. 73 The
Supreme Court, however, has recognized an implied right of action under Title IX
against educational institutions for both monetary and equitable relief.74 In Fitzgerald,
the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito, held that
Title IX does not preclude § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment equal protection gender
discrimination claims. The Court drew an important distinction between the enforcement
of federal statutory rights under § 1983 and enforcement of federal constitutional rights.
When a § 1983 claim is based upon a federal statutory right, evidence of a congressional
intent to preclude enforcement under § 1983 " . . . may be found directly in the statute
creating the right, or inferred from the statute's creation of a comprehensive enforcement
scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983."75 By contrast,
[i]n cases in which the § 1983 claim alleges a constitutional violation, lack of
congressional intent [to preclude the § 1983 remedy] may be inferred from a comparison of
the rights and protections of the statute and those existing under the Constitution. Where
the contours of such rights and protections diverge in significant ways, it is not likely that
Congress intended to displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional rights. 7 6
The Court pointed out that in the three cases in which the Supreme Court held that a
federal statutory scheme precluded the § 1983 remedy, the federal statute "required
69. The Federal Education of the Handicapped was subsequently renamed the Individuals With Disabilities
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (2009).
70. 129 S. Ct. 788.
71. Id. at 796 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012).
72. See id at 793 (citing circuit court decisions).
73. Id. at 795.
74. Franklin v. Gwinnett Co. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992); Cannon v. U of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 716
(1979).
75. Fitzgerald, 129 S. Ct. at 794 (quoting Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 120 (2005)).
76. Id.
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plaintiffs to comply with particular procedures and/or to exhaust particular
administrative remedies prior to filing suit."77 In these circumstances, allowing plaintiffs
to utilize the § 1983 remedy would have allowed them to circumvent the specific
procedural requisites in the particular federal statute, and/or obtain relief under § 1983
that is not available under the particular statute. By contrast, Title IX does not contain
specific procedures individuals must pursue that would be circumvented by allowing
§ 1983 constitutional claims.
Furthermore, Title IX does not even contain an express private claim for relief
The Court in Fitzgerald found that this absence of an express private right of action was:
a key consideration in determining congressional intent. . . . [The Supreme] Court has
never held that an implied right of action had the effect of precluding suit under § 1983,
likely because of the difficulty of discerning congressional intent in such a situation.
Mindful that [the Court] should "not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude
reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for a substantial equal protection claim," [it saw] no basis
for doing so here. 79
The Court found that in some instances, Title IX protections are narrower, and in
some respects broader, than the § 1983 constitutional remedy. The Court detailed the
various differences:
1. Title IX only reaches federally funded schools; § 1983 is not so limited.
2. Title IX covers private schools that are generally not suable under § 1983, which
reaches only state action.
3. Title IX does not authorize suit against individual officials, while § 1983 allows
claims against individual officials and municipal entities.
4. Title IX has several exemptions not applicable in § 1983 actions; "[flor
exampleTitle IX exempts elementary and secondary schools from its prohibition against
discrimination in admissions, it exempts military service schools and traditionally single-
sex public colleges from all of its provisions. Some exempted activities may form the
basis of [§ 1983] equal protection claims." 80
5. The standards of liability
may not be wholly congruent. [A] Title IX Plaintiff can establish school district liability by
showing that a single school administrator with authority to take corrective action
responded to harassment with deliberate indifference. A plaintiff stating a similar claim via
§ 1983 for violation of the Equal Protection Clause by a school district or other municipal
entity must show that the harassment was the result of municipal custom, policy, or
-81practice.
Relying upon "the divergent coverage of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause,
as well as the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme[,]" the Court found that:
77. Id. at 795 (citing Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 122; Smith, 468 U.S. at 1011-1012; Middlesex Co.
Sewerage Auth. v. Natil. Sea Clammers Assn, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)). Of these three decisions cited by the Supreme
Court, only one, Smith, raised the issue of whether a particular federal statutory scheme precluded the assertion
of a § 1983 constitutional claim.
78. Id. at 795.
79. Id. at 796 (citations omitted).
80. Fitzgerald, 129 S. Ct. at 796 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 797 (citations omitted).
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. . . Title IX was not meant to be an exclusive mechanism for addressing gender
discrimination in schools, or a substitute for § 1983 suits as a means of enforcing
constitutional rights. Accordingly, [the Court held] that § 1983 suits based on the Equal
Protection Clause remain available to plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender
discrimination in schools. 82
B. Fourth Amendment Searches
One of the largest subsets of § 1983 actions are complaints alleging violations of
the Fourth Amendment by state and local officials, usually law enforcement officers.
These actions typically assert claims of false arrest, unconstitutional searches, and use of
excessive force. Virtually every term the United States Supreme Court decides important
cases fleshing out the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Some of these decisions are
rendered in the context of § 1983 actions while others are rendered in the context of
criminal prosecutions. It is important for § 1983 litigators to be cognizant of the fact that
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment in the context of criminal
prosecutions may prove to be significant in § 1983 litigation.
The Supreme Court decided four Fourth Amendment cases last term, two of which
are especially likely to be significant in § 1983 litigation.83 In Safford Unified School
District No.1 v. Redding84 the Supreme Court held in a § 1983 action that the strip search
of a 13-year old middle school student violated the Fourth Amendment, but the
defendant officials were protected by qualified immunity. In Arizona v. Gant85 the
Court, in the context of a criminal prosecution, revamped its prior precedent and held
that police officers who arrest an automobile driver or passenger may no longer
automatically search the passenger compartment of the vehicle, but may do so only if the
arrestee is within reaching distance of the car or if it is reasonable for the officer to
believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense which is the subject of the
arrest.
82. Id. The Court found that "[t]his conclusion is consistent with Title IX's context and history." Id. The
Court pointed out that Title IX authorizes the Attorney General to intervene in private suits alleging gender
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, indicating that Congress impliedly acknowledged the
availability of the § 1983 constitutional remedy. Moreover, Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI, and Title
VI was routinely interpreted by the circuit courts to allow "parallel and concurrent § 1983 claims." Id
(citations omitted). The Supreme Court in Fitzgerald did not decide whether the plaintiffs alleged an actionable
§ 1983 equal protection claim against the school superintendent and the school committee. Fitzgerald, 129 S.
Ct. at 798.
83. The other two decisions may be significant in some § 1983 actions. In Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct.
781 (2009), the Court held that when a police officer makes a lawful traffic stop and has reasonable suspicion
that a passenger is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a Terry frisk of the passenger. See also Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court found that the reasonableness of the frisk is established when the officer
makes a lawful stop of an automobile because, for the duration of the traffic stop, "a police officer effectively
seizes 'everyone in the vehicle,' the driver and all passengers." Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at 784 (quoting Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007)). The other Fourth Amendment decision has application only to criminal
prosecutions. In Herring v. US., 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009), the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule does apply to unconstitutional searches resulting from erroneous information in law
enforcement computer records stemming from isolated negligence as opposed to deliberate or systemic
wrongdoing.
84. 129 S. Ct. 2633.
85. 129 S. Ct.1710, 1723 (2009).
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1. Student Searches
In a case that attracted great attention from the public and the media, the Court in
Redding86 held that the defendant school officials' "strip search" of 13-year old Savana
Redding, a middle school student suspected of possessing prescription strength
Ibuprofen, violated the Fourth Amendment, but that the defendant school officials were
protected from liability by qualified immunity. Justice Souter wrote the opinion for the
Court. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg wrote separate opinions, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which they agreed with the Court that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment but concluded that the officials should not have been protected by qualified
immunity. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, found that the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court did not reach plaintiffs municipal liability
Monell claim against the school district, which was remanded for consideration.
The case pitted the state's interests in drug free schools, student safety, and
compliance with school rules, against the student's Fourth Amendment privacy interests.
Savana Redding's classmate and friend, Marissa, told the assistant principal of the
school, Kerry Wilson, that she, Marissa, had obtained Ibuprofen from Savana. A female
administrative assistant and Wilson searched Savana's backpack, but found nothing.
Wilson instructed the assistant to take Savana to the school nurse. Savana was asked to
remove her pants and T-shirt and "told to pull her bra out and to the side and shake it,
and to pull out the elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to
some degree. No pills were found."8 9
Savana's mother brought a § 1983 action against the assistant principal, the
administrative assistant, the school nurse, and the school district. The Ninth Circuit held
that the strip search violated the Fourth Amendment principles established for school
officials' searches of students in New Jersey v. TL.O. 90 and that, because the search
violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law, assistant principal Wilson was not
protected by qualified immunity.91
During the oral argument, the justices struggled with the need to provide guidance
for school administrators and with deciding where to draw the line between
constitutional and unconstitutional student searches. Even some of the more liberal
justices seemed inclined to give school officials broad discretion in cases involving
schools and drugs. Justice Souter suggested that it might be better to have a student
embarrassed by a strip search "than to have some other kids dead because the stuff is
distributed at lunchtime and things go awry."92 Justice Breyer tended to downplay the
86. 129 S. Ct. at 2644.
87. See infra pt. HI(B) (discussing qualified immunity). Justices Stevens and Ginsburg each joined in the
other's separate opinion.
88. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658. A Monell claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the violation of her
federally protected rights is attributable to enforcement of a municipal policy or practice.
89. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
90. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
91. Redding v. Safford UnifiedSch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The circuit court
held that the administrative assistant and school nurse were not liable because they did not act as independent
decision makers. See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638 (describing circuit court decisions); Safford Unied, 531 F.3d
at 1089.
92. Oral Argument at 48:22-24, Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (available at 2009 WL 1064200).
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intrusiveness and humiliation of the search, suggesting that it was fairly analogous to
changing into gym clothes. 93 This seemed to frustrate Justice Ginsburg, at the time the
only female justice, who, in an unusual post-argument interview with USA Today
reporter Joan Biskupic, stated that her colleagues could not appreciate the humiliation
Savana endured because "[t]hey have never been a 13-year-old girl" and that "[i]t's a
very sensitive age for a girl." 94
The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment, but disagreed with the circuit court's determination that the search violated
clearly established Fourth Amendment law. The circuit court correctly found that the
Fourth Amendment issue was governed by the framework of principles established in
T.L.O. The Court in T.L.O., taking into account the special concerns in the school
environment, modified its normal Fourth Amendment principles and, balancing the
competing interests of the student and school, held that a school official's search of a
student does not require a search warrant, but does require: (1) reasonable suspicion
(rather than probable cause) to conclude that the student violated the law or a school rule,
and (2) the scope and manner of the search must be reasonable in relation to its
objective.95 A school search "will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." 96 The Court
upheld the search of a student's purse by school principal Theodore Chaplick based upon
the report of a teacher who observed the student smoking in the restroom, in violation of
school rules. The search discovered cigarettes, rolling papers, and marijuana.
The Court in Redding said that probable cause means a "fair probability" or
"substantial chance" 97 that a law enforcement officer's search will uncover criminal
evidence, while the "lesser standard" of "reasonable suspicion" for school searches is "a
moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing." 98 The Court said that because
school officials have the expertise in determining the rules needed for school
administration, "[e]xcept in patently arbitrary instances, Fourth Amendment analysis
takes the [school] rule as a given."9 9 The school policy in Redding strictly prohibited
non-medical use, possession, or sale of drugs on school grounds. 0 0 This flat ban makes
sense because "[t]eachers are not pharmacologists trained to identify pills and powders,
and an effective drug ban has to be enforceable fast."10 1
For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court separated the search of
Savana's outer clothing and backpack from the strip search. The Court found that the
statement from Marissa that she got the Ibuprofen from Savana constituted reasonable
93. Id. at 44-45, 58.
94. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: The Court Needs Another Woman, USA Today IA (May 6, 2009).
95. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. The Court found that the warrant requirement was "unsuited" in the school
context, because it would delay school officials who may have to act "on the spot" and, presumably, because
school officials are not well versed in Fourth Amendment warrant law. See id.
96. Id. at 342.
97. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2639 (quoting Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244 n. 13 (1983)).
98. Id
99. Id. at 2640 n. 1.
100. Id. at 2639-2640.
101. Id. at 2640 n. 1.
2009 245
15
Schwartz: Supreme Court Section 1983 Decisions - October 2008 Term
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2009
TULSA LAW REVIEW
suspicion "to justify a search of Savana's backpack and outer clothing. If a student is
reasonably suspected of giving out contraband pills, she is reasonably suspected of
carrying them on her person and in the carryall . . . ."102
The strip search, however, was another matter entirely. Because the strip search
was so intrusive, it required a separate Fourth Amendment analysis and evaluation
compared to the search of the outer clothing and backpack. It is a "quantum leap" from a
backpack/outer clothing search to a search exposing a student's intimate areas. 103 The
meaning, degradation and intrusiveness of a strip place such a search "in a category of its
own demanding its own specific suspicions." 1 04
The Court found that the defendant school officials did not have reasonable
suspicion to make Savana pull her bra out and shake it, and pull out the elastic on her
underpants which, the Court said, was fairly described as a "strip search."1o5 Whether or
not the student was strip searched should not depend upon "who was looking and how
much was seen." 106 The Court found that this strip search infringed Savana's subjective
and reasonably objective expectation of privacy:
The very fact of Savana's pulling her underwear away from her body in the presence of the
two [school] officials who were able to see her necessarily exposed her breasts and pelvic
area to some degree, and both subjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal
privacy support the treatment of such a search as categorically distinct, requiring distinct
elements of justification on the part of school authorities for going beyond a search of outer
clothing and belongings. 107
The Court found that "Savana's subjective expectation of privacy against such a
search is inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating[,]"
and that "[t]he reasonableness of her expectation . . . is indicated by the consistent
experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability
intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure."
10 8
The Court made clear that the context in which a school search occurs is critical.
"Changing for gym is getting ready for play[,]" but "exposing for a search is responding
to an accusation reserved for suspected wrongdoers and fairly understood as so
degrading that a number of communities have decided that strip searches in schools are
never reasonable and have banned them no matter what the facts may be." 109 Although
the "indignity" of a search does not necessarily mean that it violates the Fourth
Amendment, the strip search was unreasonable in Redding because of its extreme
intrusiveness in relation to the information possessed by the school officials. The Court
stated:
[W]hat was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to Savana was any indication of
danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity, and any reason to
102. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.
103. Id. at 2643.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2641 ("The exact label ... is not important, though strip search is a fair way to speak of it.").
106. Id.
107. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.
108. Id. (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 2642 (citing a N.Y.C. Department of Education Policy prohibiting all strip searches of students).
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suppose that Savana was carrying pills in her underwear . . . [T]he combination of these
deficiencies was fatal to finding the search reasonable.I 10
Nevertheless, because the Court found that the Fourth Amendment law was not clearly
established when the search occurred, the defendant officials were protected from
liability by qualified immunity.1 11
The Court's Fourth Amendment analysis suggests that the Court was not banning
all strip searches of public school students.112 Although there was an insufficient
justification to strip search Savana Redding, there might be justification if school
officials have information that there is a danger to the students or that drugs are secreted
in the student's underwear. Savana Redding's lawyer, Adam Wolf of the American Civil
Liberties Union, said that the "decision sends a clear signal to school officials that they
can strip search students only in the most extraordinary situations."1 1 3 By contrast,
Matthew W. Wright, the attorney for the school defendants, bemoaned the fact that the
Court's decision limits "the ability of school officials to protect students from the
harmful effects of drugs and weapons on school campuses."1 14
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment for the defendants but dissenting on
the Fourth Amendment determination, lamented the Court's failure to defer to the
judgment of school officials who have the necessary expertise in school administration
and are charged with the difficult ongoing task of maintaining discipline in the schools,
and preventing "ugly" drug use and violent crime. 115 In his view, "the Court has
undercut student safety and undermined the authority of school administrators and local
officials." 1 l6 He advocated, as he had in his concurrence in Morse v. Frederick,117 a
return to the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis, under which courts are reluctant
to interfere with the routine decisions of school officials.
2. Automobile Searches
In Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice
Stevens, substantially modified, if not downright overturned, 118 its prior decisions in
New York v. Beltonll9 and Thornton v. U.S.120 by limiting the circumstances in which an
officer may search a vehicle incident to the arrest of its driver or passenger. 12 1 The
decisions in Belton and Thornton gave the officer automatic authority to make a
110. Id. at 2642-2643.
111. Infra pt. III(B).
112. See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
113. Jesse J. Holland, Justices: Strip Search of Teen Illegal, The Journal News B4 (June 26, 2009).
114. Adam Liptak, School Search of Girl by School Officials Seeking Drugs Was Illegal, Justices Rule, N.Y.
Times A16 (June 26, 2009).
115. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2646 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
116. Id. at 2657.
117. 551 U.S. 393, 414 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
118. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1722 n. 9. The majority disagreed with the dissent's view that the Court
overruled Belton. Id.
119. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
120. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
121. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1712-1713. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court, which was joined by
Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justices
Kennedy and Breyer. Id. at 1713-1714.
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warrantless search of the passenger compartment of a car incident to the arrest of the
driver or passenger. The Belton-Thornton doctrine was a subset of the broader search
incident to arrest doctrine, which allows an officer to search the arrestee and the area
within the arrestee's immediate control, i.e., the so-called "grabbing" or lunging area.122
The twin rationales for the search incident to arrest doctrine are officer safety-the
arrestee might have or lunge for a weapon-and the preservation of criminal evidence
the arrestee might seek to secret or destroy. By allowing the arresting officer to search
the compartment of the vehicle, the Belton-Thornton doctrine, in effect, created a rather
large lunging area.
The Belton-Thornton doctrine was intended to give the arresting officer an easy to
follow "bright line" rule. This point was stressed in Justice Alito's dissent in Gant.123 On
the other hand, Justice Stevens' opinion for the majority focused upon the fact that the
rationale of Belton-Thornton was based on what was normally a highly improbable
scenario in which an arrestee that is securely in police custody, perhaps handcuffed in
back of the police car, nevertheless breaks away from the police and gains entry into his
automobile to obtain a weapon or criminal evidence.124 For example, in Gant, Rodney
Gant, who was arrested for driving with a suspended license, was handcuffed and locked
in the back of patrol car when the officers searched his car and found cocaine. To think
that Gant and other arrestees in like circumstances might somehow break free from
police custody and gain entry into his car and obtain a weapon or criminal evidence
conjures up images of comical, bumbling, incompetent police. So the Court, responding
to a "chorus" of courts, scholars, and Supreme Court justices who called for a
reexamination of Belton, 12 did just that. The majority held that police officers may no
longer automatically search the automobile incident to the arrest of the driver or
passenger. 126
The Court in Gant held that the officer may search the passenger compartment of
the car in two situations: (1) when the arrestee is not securely in police custody and the
passenger compartment is "within reaching distance" of the arrestee,127 or (2) "when it is
reasonable [for the officer] to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be
found in the vehicle." 1 28 Because the first possibility is fairly unlikely, litigation in both
122. See Chirnel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
123. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1727 (Alito, J. dissenting).
124. Id. at 1718-1719 (majority).
125. Id. at 1716.
126. Justice Scalia, concurring, expressed the view that the police officer may search the vehicle incident to
arrest "only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of another
crime that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred." Id. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring). No other
justice took this position to break the 4-4 tie. Justice Scalia aligned himself with the position of the Stevens
group, explained in the text below, rather than with the Alito dissent, which sought to maintain the Belton-
Thornton rule. Id.
127. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723 (majority).
128. Id. at 1714. As the Court indicated, when a warrantless search of the car cannot be justified as incident
to the arrest of the driver or passenger, it may be justified under the separate "automobile exception" which
allows a warrantless search of a vehicle, or part of a vehicle, when the officer has probable cause to conclude
that the vehicle contains criminal evidence. Id. at 1721 (citing US. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1992)). In addition,
an officer may search a vehicle's passenger compartment when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual
is dangerous and might gain access to the vehicle to obtain a weapon. Id (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983)).
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criminal prosecutions and § 1983 actions is likely to focus on the second possibility, i.e.,
whether it was "reasonable" for the arresting officer to believe that evidence of the
offense of the arrest might be found in the vehicle. One of the uncertainties not discussed
by the Court is whether, and if so, how, this reasonableness standard differs from
probable cause. Presumably it does differ, for otherwise the court would have invoked
the generally applicable probable cause standard. In any case, whether the officer's belief
was reasonable will require case-by-case adjudication. In close § 1983 cases when a
court finds that the officer's belief was not reasonable, the officer may still be protected
from personal liability by qualified immunity. 129
C. No Due Process Right to Post-Conviction DNA Testing
DNA evidence is powerful, having "an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the
wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty[,]"l30 and has lead to extraordinary numbers
of exonerations.131 Despite this acknowledgement, the Supreme Court, in District
Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne,132 held 5-4 that a convicted
criminal defendant does not have either a procedural or substantive due process right to
post-conviction DNA testing of evidence, even at his own expense. The Court, in
reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, split along its typical ideological lines.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas and Alito joined. Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Kennedy and, as to Part II, by Justice Thomas. Justice Stevens wrote the main dissent,
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer and, as to Part I, by Justice Souter. Justice Souter
wrote a separate dissent.
The case had a somewhat lengthy history. In brief, Osborne was convicted in
Alaska state court of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault. He was sentenced to 26
years in prison. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, and his attempts
for post conviction relief in state court failed. He filed a § 1983 action in federal district
court asserting a constitutional right to access evidence for DNA testing at his own
expense. (He sought to utilize a sophisticated form of DNA testing not available at the
time of his criminal trial). The case was in the Ninth Circuit twice. On the first go round,
the circuit court held that Osborne had a right to assert his constitutional claims under
§ 1983.133 The second time around, the circuit court held for Osborne on his due process
claims, finding that the prosecutor's due process duty to disclose exculpatory material
Justice Alito, dissenting in Gant, opined that the court's decision will lead to reexamination of searches
incident to arrest in the home. Id. at 1731 (Alito, J., dissenting).
129. See pt. III(B); see e.g. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1989). In Gant, the Court said that
"[b]ecause a broad reading of Belton has been widely accepted, the doctrine of qualified immunity will shield
officers from liability for searches conducted [pre-Gant] in reasonable reliance on that understanding." Gant,
129 S. Ct. at 1722 n. 11.
130. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2312.
131. Id. at 2337, 2337 n. 9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing authorities). During the past two decades, DNA
evidence has exonerated 232 wrongly convicted individuals, including 17 on death row. Bill Mears, Supreme
Court Denies DNA Test to Rapist, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/06/18/rapist.dnal index.html (June 18,
2009).
132. 129 S. Ct. 2308.
133. Osborne v. D.A.'s Off for Third Judicial Dist., 423 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2005).
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extends to post-conviction proceedings. 134
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (1) whether Osborne's due
process claims could be asserted under § 1983, as opposed to in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding, and (2) whether Osborne had a due process right to post-conviction access to
the State's evidence for DNA testing. The first issue is essentially procedural in nature.
Constitutional claims asserted by convicted state court defendants may come literally
within both § 1983 and the federal habeas corpus statute.135 In Preiser v. Rodriquez,136
the Supreme Court in 1973 held that when a state prisoner seeks immediate or speedier
release from confinement, the claim comes within the "core" of habeas corpus and must
be filed under federal habeas corpus rather than § 1983. Unlike § 1983, a federal habeas
corpus claim requires exhaustion of state judicial remedies. 137 Prieser's rationale is that
the more specific federal habeas remedy prevails over the more general § 1983 remedy,
and that state prisoners should not be able to obviate habeas corpus limitations by the
simple expedient of labeling the pleading a § 1983 complaint. Since the decision in
Preiser, both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have frequently struggled
with the § 1983/habeas corpus distinction. 138
In Osborne, the Supreme Court sidestepped "this difficult issue" by assuming that
Osborne's claim was properly asserted under § 1983 because, "[e]ven under this
assumption," the Court held that the circuit court erred in finding a due process
violation. 139 In rejecting Osborne's claimed due process right to post-conviction access
to the State's evidence for DNA testing, the Court relied heavily upon the rather
pervasive, thoughtful legislative responses to the issue. In recent years, forty-six states,
134. Osborne v. D.A. 's Off for Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2009).
136. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
138. The decisional law on the issue is voluminous. See Schwartz, supra n. 61, at §§ 10.05-10.07.
139. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319. The Court in Osborne articulated the arguments on both sides of the §
1983 habeas corpus issue. Plaintiff argued that he sought access to DNA testing and, even if DNA testing
exonerated him, his conviction would not be automatically invalidated; that his claim was analogous to
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), where the Court held that a procedural due process claim by prisoners
seeking new hearings for parole eligibility could be filed under § 1983 because relief for plaintiffs would not
itself bring about earlier release; and that all circuit courts that considered the issue post-Dotson found that a
post conviction claim of access to DNA evidence is assertable under § 1983 because success on the claim does
not necessarily mean speedier release. See e.g. McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007); Savory v.
Lyons, 469 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006); Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2007); Harvey v. Horan, 285
F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002).
The dissent agreed with plaintiff's position. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2331 n. 1. The State, however,
argued that Osborne was in essence asserting a claim of actual innocence within the core of habeas corpus, and
that Dotson was distinguishable because, inter alia, the challenged procedures in that case "did not affect the
ultimate 'exercise of discretion by the parole board.' " Id. at 2318-2319 (quoting Br. for Pet. at 32, Osborne,
129 S.Ct 2308).
Justice Alito, concurring, joined by Justice Kennedy, acknowledged that although it is sometimes
difficult to decide the § 1983/habeas corpus distinction, the Osborne case fell on the habeas side of the line
because, like Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) claims, Osborne's claimed right to DNA evidence, if
successful, would undermine his guilt or punishment, and thus falls within the core of habeas corpus. Osborne,
129 S. Ct. at 2325 (Alito, J., concurring). "It is no answer to say.....that [plaintiffl simply wants to use § 1983
as a discovery tool to lay the foundation for a future state postconviction application, a state clemency petition,
or a request for relief by means of prosecutorial consent[,]" because these factors "implicate precisely the same
federalism and comity concerns that motivated our decisions (and Congress') to impose exhaustion
requirements and discovery limits in federal habeas proceedings." Id. at 2325 (citation omitted).
250 Vol. 45:231
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 45 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss2/3
SUPREME COURT§ 1983 DECISIONS
the District of Columbia, and Congress enacted DNA testing statutes. 140 Only four
states, Alabama, Alaska, Massachusetts, and Oklahoma, had not. 14 1 But Alaska did have
general procedures authorizing prisoners to obtain access to evidence that might prove
their innocence.142 The majority found that recognizing a due process right to post-
conviction DNA testing "would take the development of rules and procedures in this area
out of the hands of legislatures and state courts shaping policy in a focused manner and
turn it over to federal courts applying the broad parameters of the Due Process
Clause" 14 3 or, in other words, "short-circuit what looks to be a prompt and considered
legislative response."l44 The Court in Osborne analogized to Washington v.
Glucksburg1 45 where the Court, in rejecting a claimed substantive due process right to
physician-assisted suicide, relied partly on the fact that the states were "engaged in
serious, thoughtful examinations" of the issue, 14 6 and that constitutionalizing the issue
would "to a great extent [have placed] the matter outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action."l47 However, this was not the heart of the Court's analysis in
Glucksberg, but more in the nature of a "by the way" afterthought of a wholesome
byproduct of rejecting the claimed due process right to physician-assisted suicide.
In the author's view, this aspect of the Court's analysis in Osborne is highly
troublesome. To begin with, Glucksberg did not present circumstances analogous to
those in Osborne. In fact, Glucksberg could be viewed as the direct opposite of Osborne
since, when Glucksberg was decided, only one state, Oregon, had a law legalizing
physician-assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill adults and, as the Court
acknowledged, while many proposals were introduced in states' legislatures to legalize
assisted suicide, none were enacted at that time. 14 8 The Supreme Court in Glucksberg
pointed to the lack of widespread physician-assisted suicide to lend support to its
conclusion that it is not an activity that was "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." 1 49 In Osborne the Court relied upon widespread legislative recognition of the
right to justify denial of the due process right because "[t]o suddenly constitutionalize
this area would short-circuit what looks to be a prompt and considered legislative
response," and there is no reason to think that the answers of the federal courts would
"be any better than those of state courts and legislatures."
150
Lawyers and their clients who assert due process claims should thus be forgiven if
they feel that the Court has them coming and going. The Court will deny the claimed due
process right when state legislatures are by and large recognizing the right, as in
140. Id at 2322 (majority). See also id. at 2326 n. 2 (Alito, J. concurring )(compilation of statutes); id. at
2335 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2326 n. 2 (Alito, J., concurring).
142. Alaska Stat. §§ 12.72.020(b)(2), 12.72.010(4) (2009).
143. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2312.
144. Id. at 2322.
145. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
146. Id. at 719.
147. Id. at 720.
148. Id. at 717.
149. Id. at 721 (quoting Moore v.City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
150. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2323; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006) (in denying
First Amendment protection for public employee speech pursuant to official duties, court noted a "powerful
network of legislative enactments ... available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing").
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Osborne, and when by and large they are not, as in Glucksberg.
Most fundamentally, individual federal constitutional rights should be guaranteed
regardless of the will or whim of legislative bodies. In other words, federal constitutional
guarantees should stand firm and provide protection regardless of policies legislative
bodies may in their prerogative choose to adopt. A right as fundamental as one's
procedural due process right to an opportunity to be heard should not be dependent on
the will of state legislatures. Furthermore, legislative policies differ from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, with different degrees of protections and limitations. Some legislative
policies may comport with the Constitution while others do not. Regardless, they simply
cannot substitute for a protection guaranteed uniformly by the federal Constitution. To
put it bluntly, either a right is guaranteed by the Constitution or it is not; Osborne's due
process rights were either violated or they were not violated. But the answer to these
constitutional questions should not depend upon the policies state legislatures around the
country decided to adopt. Justice Jackson in his landmark opinion in West Virginia State
Board ofEducation v. Barnette stated it well:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty,
and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections. 15 1
Unfortunately, the Court in Osborne did not heed Justice Jackson's wisdom and its
deference to legislative enactments heavily colored its due process analysis against the
plaintiff. 152
The Court analyzed separately the procedural and substantive due process claims
asserted by Osborne. 153 In rejecting the procedural due process claim, the Court held that
the prosecutor's Brady v. Marylandl54 due process obligation to disclose exculpatory
material to the defense is a fair trial right that does not apply post-conviction.
Nevertheless, the Court did find that Osborne had a state-created liberty interest in access
to evidence for post-conviction DNA testing in order to demonstrate his innocence.
Although "noncapital defendants do not have a liberty interest in traditional state
executive clemency, to which no particular claimant is entitled as a matter of state
151. 319 U.S. 634, 638 (1934)); see also Bd. of Commrs. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 680 (1996); Garretti, 547
U.S. at 448 (Souter, J. dissenting).
152. It is interesting to contrast the Court's decision in Osborne with its decision in Caperton v. A.J Massey
Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). The Court in Caperton held, 5-4, that the plaintiff had a due process right to
recusal of a state court appeals judge who had received extraordinary campaign contributions from and on
behalf of the corporate defendant. The Court recognized a due process right of recusal when, from an objective
standpoint, there is a serious risk of actual bias, even though every jurisdiction has some kind of recusal policy.
Justice Kennedy, who joined the majority in Osborne, wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice Stevens,
Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. Thus,
Justice Kennedy cast the critical fifth vote in each case.
153. Justice Souter, dissenting, agreed with Circuit Court Judge Lutwig that "there is no hermetic line
between the substantive and the procedural in due process analysis . . . and in this case one could argue back
and forth about the better characterization of various state conditions as being one or the other." Osborne, 129
S. Ct. at 2342 n. 2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
154. 373 U.S. 83.
Vol. 45:231252
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 45 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss2/3
SUPREME COURT§ 1983 DECISIONS
law[,]" 1 55 Osborne did have a state-created liberty interest in demonstrating his
innocence. As the Court recognized, in some circumstances, a state-created liberty
interest may generate procedural due process requirements.1 56
This liberty interest, however, was rather limited because a convicted defendant
found guilty after a fair trial has a significantly diminished liberty interest compared to a
presumptively innocent person:
The State accordingly has more flexibility in deciding what procedures are needed in the
context of postconviction relief . . . .Osborne's right to due process is not parallel to a trial
right, but rather must be analyzed in light of the fact that he has already been found guilty
at a fair trial, and has only a limited interest in postconviction relief Brady is the wrong
framework. 157
The Court ruled that the pertinent question is whether the State's post-conviction
procedures " 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental' or 'transgresses any recognized principle
of fundamental fairness in operation.' " 158 In other words, "[f]ederal courts may upset a
State's postconviction relief procedures only if they are fundamentally inadequate to
vindicate the substantive rights provided.',159 The Court found that Alaska's
postconviction procedures were facially adequate to obtain access to evidence for DNA
testing. Further, Osborne did not demonstrate that Alaska's postconviction procedures
were inadequate in operation. The Court stated:
This is not to say that Osborne must exhaust state-law remedies. But it is Osborne's burden
to demonstrate the inadequacy of the state-law procedures available to him in state
postconviction relief These procedures are adequate on their face, and without trying
them, Osborne can hardly complain that they do not work in practice.160
This is consistent with the position of numerous lower federal courts that § 1983
claimants who allege procedural due process claims must pursue the available
procedures and demonstrate their inadequacy.161 This is not considered an exhaustion
requirement but is in effect an element of a procedural due process claim.
The Court had little difficulty rejecting Osborne's claimed substantive due process
right to post-conviction DNA testing. The Court reiterated its strong reluctance to expand
substantive due process rights because "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in
this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended."l 62 The Court found "no long history of
155. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319 (citing Conn. Bd ofPardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981)).
156. The state-created liberty interest was based upon Alaska law, which provides "that those who use
'newly discovered evidence' to 'establis[h] by clear and convincing evidence that [they are] innocent may
obtain 'vacation of [their] conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.' " Id. at 2319 (quoting Alaska Stat.
§§ 12.72.020(b)(2), 12.72.010(4)).
157. Id. at 2320.
158. Id at 2320 (quoting Medina v. Ca., 505 U.S. 427, 446 (1992)). Interestingly, this is one of the tests used
by the Supreme Court to determine whether provisions of the Bill of Rights should be incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states. See e.g. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
159. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320.
160. Id. at 2321 (citations omitted). Although Osborne asserted an "actual innocence" claim, he conceded
that such a claim would have to be asserted in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 2321-2322.
161. See Schwartz, supra n. 61, at§ 10.3.
162. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2322 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)); see also
Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702.
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such a right [to postconviction DNA testing], and '[t]he mere novelty of such a claim is
reason enough to doubt that "substantive due process" sustains it.' "163
The Court in Osborne found that recognizing a substantive due process right to
postconviction DNA testing would not only interfere with the ongoing legislative
responses, but "would cast these statutes into constitutional doubt and [the Court would]
be forced to take over the issue of DNA access" itself.164 Furthermore,
constitutionalizing "a freestanding right to access DNA evidence for testing" would force
the Court to act as a policymaker, potentially enmeshing the Court in numerous details
surrounding the right, including, whether there is a "constitutional obligation to preserve
forensic evidence that might later be tested . . . and, [i]f so, for how long[.] Would it be
different for different types of evidence? Would the State also have some obligation to
gather such evidence in the first place? How much, and when?"1 65 "[I]t is hard to
imagine what tools federal courts would use to answer them."166 In other words,
recognizing a new due process right to post conviction DNA testing would likely usher
in a new wave of ongoing § 1983 (or federal habeas) litigation attempting to flesh out the
contours of the right. The Court made clear that, in its view, this would not be a
wholesome development.167
Justice Stevens, dissenting, found that a convicted defendant has a procedural due
process right to post-conviction DNA testing. He invoked the principle that "[a]lthough
States are under no obligation to provide mechanisms for postconviction relief, when
they choose to do so, the procedures they employ must comport with the demands of the
Due Process Clause[.]" 168 He found that Alaska's statute pertaining to post-conviction
relief is not facially deficient, but "the state courts' application of [it] raises serious
questions whether the State's procedures are fundamentally unfair in their operation."l69
Alaska never provided "any concrete reason for denying Osborne the DNA testing he
seeks, and none is apparent." 170 In contrast to the majority, Justice Stevens advanced the
view that a prosecutor's Brady obligations should extend postconviction because the
fundamental fairness concerns that motivated the Brady doctrine "are equally present
when convicted persons . . . seek access to dispositive DNA evidence following
conviction." 17 1 As a matter of substantive due process, Justice Stevens found that "the
State's refusal to provide Osborne with access to evidence for DNA testing qualifies as
arbitrary."l72 There were persuasive reasons to require the DNA testing and no good
163. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2322 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993)).
164. Id at 2322.
165. Id. at 2323.
166. Id.
167. Justice Alito, concurring, opined in Part I of his concurrence that Osborne's claim must be asserted in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding, not under § 1983, and in Part II of his concurrence, in which Justices
Kennedy and Thomas joined, agreed with the majority that the Court should not interfere with legislative
efforts of the federal Government and the States. He also pointed out that the DNA does not provide absolute
proof of anything, in part because of DNA evidence entails risks associated with mishandling and
contamination of evidence. Id at 2327 (Alito, J. concurring).
168. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985)).
169. Id. at 2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2336.
171. Id. at 2335.
172. Id. at 2336.
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reason to deny it. Justice Stevens also disagreed with the Court's reliance on its goal of
not interfering with legislative developments. "[A] decision to recognize a limited [due
process] right of postconviction access to DNA testing would not prevent the States from
creating procedures by which litigants request and obtain such access; it would merely
ensure that States do so in a manner that is nonarbitrary." 1 73 Not surprisingly, groups
dedicated to exonerating the wrongfully convicted criticized the Court's decision. 174
III. IMMUNITIES
Officials who are sued for money damages under § 1983 may be entitled to assert
an absolute or qualified immunity. In general, officials who carry out judicial,
prosecutorial, and legislative functions are protected by an absolute immunity, while
officials who carry out executive and administrative functions are protected by qualified
immunity. Although quite formidable, qualified immunity provides less protection than
an absolute immunity.
Whether an official is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity depends on the
"nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it."17 5 In
other words, the immunity that an official is entitled to assert depends upon the nature of
the function carried out, rather than the official's title. As a result, an official may be
entitled to absolute immunity for carrying out one function, and qualified immunity for
another function. For example, a judge may assert absolute judicial immunity for
conduct relating to her judicial functions, but qualified immunity for conduct relating to
executive and administrative functions, such as hiring and firing court employees. 17 6
As discussed below, the Supreme Court last term rendered an important decision
concerning prosecutorial immunity and three important decisions concerning qualified
immunity.
A. Prosecutorial Immunity
Victims of wrongful convictions suffered a serious setback in Osborne.177 They
suffered a second set back in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein.178 In the seminal case of Imbler
v. Pachtman, the Supreme Court held that prosecutors are absolutely immune when
acting as an advocate for the state and engaging in conduct "intimately associated with
173. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2339. Justice Stevens concluded that "Osborne has demonstrated a
constitutionally protected right to due process which the State of Alaska thus far has not vindicated and which
this Court is both empowered and obliged to safeguard." Id.
In his separate dissent, Justice Souter concluded that Alaska violated Osborne's procedural due process
liberty interest by failing to afford him effective process "for vindicating the liberty interest in demonstrating
innocence that the state law recognizes." Id at 2340 (Souter, J., dissenting). He stated: "[Tihe record convinces
me that, while Alaska has created an entitlement of access to DNA evidence under conditions that are facially
reasonable, the State has demonstrated a combination of inattentiveness and intransigence in applying those
conditions that add up to procedural unfairness that violates the Due Process Clause." Id. at 2343. Justice
Souter saw no need to reach the substantive due process issue.
174. See No Constitutional Due Process Right Exists to Evidence for Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 77 U.S.
L. Week 1794 (June 23, 2009).
175. Forrester v. Wite, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988); accordKalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997).
176. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 219.
177. See infra pt. II(C).
178. 129 S. Ct. 855.
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the judicial phase of the criminal process[.]" 1 79 Thus, prosecutors are absolutely immune
for "initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case." 180 The prosecutor in
Imbler was absolutely immune even for knowingly using false testimony at trial and the
deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence.181 Prosecutors, however, have not
normally been protected by absolute immunity for their investigative and administrative
functions not related to trial preparation. For example, prosecutors are not absolutely
immune for engaging in investigative activity prior to the establishment of probable
cause to arrest,182 giving the police legal advice during the investigative phase,183 and
holding a press conference. 184
Last term, in Van de Kamp,185 the Court held that absolute prosecutorial immunity
protected a District Attorney and his Chief Deputy from monetary liability on a § 1983
wrongful conviction claim. In an unanimous opinion written by Justice Stephen G.
Breyer, the Court found that prosecutorial immunity encompassed allegations that the
District Attorney and his Chief Deputy failed to adequately train and supervise
prosecutors in their office on their Brady obligations and also failed to establish an
internal information system concerning impeachment material. 18 6
Although prosecutorial immunity has long been strong medicine, Van de Kamp
strengthens it even more. Ironically, the Supreme Court's decisions in Van de Kamp and
Osborne were rendered during a time of increased public concern about wrongful
convictions. DNA testing has documented increasing numbers of wrongful conviction
cases.187 Close on the heels of the New York State Bar Association's creation of a task
force to study wrongful convictions in New York, newly appointed Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals Jonathan Lippman recently created another task force to
study the subject, including the exploring of measures to minimize wrongful convictions.
In announcing the task force, Chief Judge Lippman asked: "What could be worse for the
branch of government whose constitutional responsibility is to administer justice than to
have an injustice, a wrongful conviction?" 188
Wrongful convictions have been attributed to a variety of causes. The most
prevalent culprits are ineffective assistance of counsel, mistaken eyewitness
identifications, mishandling forensic evidence, false confessions, prosecutors' use of
false testimony and fabricated evidence, and police and prosecutorial suppression of
exculpatory evidence. 189 Nevertheless, claims for damages based upon prosecutorial
misconduct are almost always met with the defense of prosecutorial immunity. And,
179. 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
180. Id. at 431.
181. Id. at 409, 431.
182. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 277-278 (1933).
183. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492-496 (1991).
184. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 277-278.
185. 129 S. Ct. 855.
186. Id. at 862-865.
187. Infra pt. II(C).
188. Joel Stashenko, Lippman Forms Task Force to Study Ways to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, N.Y.L.J. Al
(May 1, 2009).
189. N.Y. Bar Assn., Preliminary Report of the New York Bar Association's Task Force on Wrongful
Convictions (Jan. 30, 2009) (available at www.reentry.net/ny/library/attachment.147932).
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when prosecutorial immunity applies, it shields even blatantly unconstitutional conduct.
Thomas Goldstein alleged in his federal court § 1983 complaint that the Los
Angeles prosecutors' failure to disclose vital impeachment evidence led to his wrongful
homicide conviction. He alleged that he was convicted of murder in 1980,
that his conviction depended in critical part upon the testimony of Edward Floyd Fink, a
jailhouse informant; that Fink's testimony was unreliable, indeed false; that Fink had
previously received reduced sentences for providing prosecutors with favorable testimony
in other cases; that at least some prosecutors in the Los Angeles County District Attorney's
Office knew about the favorable treatment; that the office had not provided Goldstein's
attorney with that information; and that ... the prosecution's failure to provide Goldstein's
attorney with this potential impeachment information had led to his erroneous
190
conviction.
The allegations in Goldstein's § 1983 complaint were substantiated by the decision
in his previously filed federal habeas corpus proceeding. After holding an evidentiary
hearing, the federal habeas court found that Fink did not give truthful testimony and that
if the prosecution had told Goldstein's lawyer that "Fink had received prior rewards in
return for favorable testimony it might have made a difference." 19 1 The habeas corpus
court ordered the state to either grant Goldstein a new trial or to release him. After the
circuit court affirmed the decision of the district court in the habeas proceeding, the state
decided to release Goldstein, who had already served 24 years of his sentence.
At this point, Goldstein filed his § 1983 action in federal district court. The
complaint asserted that the trial prosecutors' failure to turn over Giglio exculpatory
impeachment materiall92 violated his due process Brady right to receive exculpatory
material, and that this constitutional violation was attributable to the failures of the Los
Angeles District Attorney and his Chief Deputy to adequately train and supervise their
prosecutors concerning Brady impeachment material and to establish an information
system within the District Attorney's office regarding impeachment material about
jailhouse informants. 193
Recent years have seen a proliferation of § 1983 Brady claims. 194 Plaintiffs'
lawyers, however, know all too well that a § 1983 claim against the prosecutor who tried
the criminal case based upon her failure to turn over Brady materials would be doomed
for failure by prosecutorial immunity because Brady obligations are part of the
prosecutor's advocacy functions. 195 To avoid dismissal based upon prosecutorial
immunity, plaintiffs' lawyers sometimes seek to hold a police officer responsible for
failing to disclose exculpatory material to the prosecutor. 19 6 But what if the Brady
violation cannot be attributed to a police officer? Goldstein's counsel attempted an
alternative strategy of asserting the § 1983 claim against the supervising attorneys in the
D.A.'s office, namely, the District Attorney and his Chief Deputy. Then, in response to
190. Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 859.
I91 Id.
192. See Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
193. Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 859.
194. See Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Brady Claims, N.Y.L.J. 3 (Apr. 18, 2008).
195. See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. 409, 430-431; Yarris v. Co. of Del., 465 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2006).
196. See e.g. Moldowan v. City of Warren, 573 F.3d. 309 (6th Cir, 2009).
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the defendant's assertion of prosecutorial immunity, Goldstein's counsel argued that the
alleged wrongdoing of the supervisors was an "administrative" action rather than
advocacy, and thus not within absolute prosecutorial immunity. 19 7
The strategy worked in the lower courts. Both the federal district court and Ninth
Circuit held that absolute immunity did not defeat Goldstein's § 1983 claims because the
complaint alleged administrative rather than advocacy actions by the defendants. 198
However, when the Supreme Court granted defendants' petition for certiorari, the Ninth
Circuit's decision seemed to be in serious jeopardy. After all, Goldstein's formulation of
his § 1983 claims against the District Attorney and his Deputy was a rather transparent
attempt to circumvent prosecutorial immunity. It seemed likely that the Supreme Court
would reverse, but it was unclear on what basis.
In fact, the oral argument in Van de Kamp was permeated with references by
counsel for the defendant officials, the United States as amicus curiae in support of
defendants, as well as by Chief Justice Roberts, about plaintiff s attempt to "circumvent"
and make an "end-run" around prosecutorial immunity. 199 Sure enough, this became a
major basis of the Supreme Court's decision overturning the Ninth Circuit, and holding
that the District Attorney and his Chief Deputy were protected by absolute prosecutorial
immunity.
The purpose of absolute prosecutorial immunity is to allow prosecutors to carry out
their advocacy functions independently without looking over their shoulder fearing
monetary liability and to prevent deflection of prosecutorial energies to the defense of
claims for damages. 200 However, as the Court in Van de Kamp recognized, prosecutorial
immunity does not extend to a prosecutor's conduct that is not intimately related to the
judicial process. The Court in Van de Kamp stated:
In the years since Imbler, we have held that absolute immunity applies when a prosecutor
prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding, or appears in court to present evidence in support
of a search warrant application, [but not] when a prosecutor gives advice to police during a
criminal investigation, when the prosecutor makes statements to the press, or when a
prosecutor acts as a complaining witness in support of a warrant application. [ Van de
Kamp], unlike these earlier cases, requires us to consider how immunity applies where a
prosecutor is engaged in certain administrative activities.201
The Court agreed with Goldstein that his § 1983 complaint attacked the D.A.
"office's administrative procedures."202 Nevertheless, and even assuming that the
District Attorney and his Chief Deputy had "certain" due process obligations "as to
training, supervision, or information-system management[,]" the Court held "that
prosecutors involved in such supervision or training or information-system management
enjoy absolute immunity from the kind of legal claims at issue here."N3 The Court
reasoned that prosecutorial immunity was applicable because defendants' contested
197. Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 859.
198. Goldstein v. Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2007).
199. Oral Argument 13-14, 19, 21, 43, Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. 855 (available at 2008 WL 4804009).
200. Van De Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 860.
201. Id. at 861 (citations omitted).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 861-862.
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administrative actions were intimately connected to the criminal prosecution against
Goldstein. The Court put it this way:
Here, unlike other [§ 1983] claims related to administrative decisions, an individual
prosecutor's error in the plaintiffs specific criminal trial constitutes an essential element of
the plaintiffs claim. The administrative obligations at issue here are thus unlike
administrativeduties concerning, for example, workplace hiring, payroll administration, the
maintenance of physical facilities, and the like. Moreover, the types of activities on which
Goldstein's claims focus necessarily require legal knowledge and the exercise of related
discretion, e.g., in determining what information should be included in the training or the
supervision or the information-system management. 204
The Court fortified its reasoning with a hypothetical example of a claim against a
supervisory prosecutor clearly covered by prosecutorial immunity. Assume that
Goldstein asserted a claim for damages not only against the trial prosecutor, but also
against a supervisory prosecutor on the grounds that they should have turned over
impeachment material. Such a claim would contest trial preparation intimately associated
with the judicial process and thus lie within the heart of absolute prosecutorial immunity.
The only difference between a trial prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory material and
the hypothetical is:
That, in our hypothetical case, a prosecutorial supervisor ... might himself be liable for
damages instead of the trial prosecutor. But we cannot find that difference (in the pattern of
liability among prosecutors within a single office) to be critical. Decisions about
indictment or trial prosecution will often involve more than one prosecutor within an
office.20 5
The Court in Van de Kamp found that the fact that the defendants' general
supervisory, training, and information-management actions were at issue rather than
supervision of a particular prosecution was not significant. The Court stated that this
difference does not preclude an intimate connection between prosecutorial activity and the
trial process. The management tasks at issue ... concern how and when to make
impeachment information available at a trial. They are thereby directly connected with the
prosecutor's basic trial advocacy duties. And, in terms of Imbler's functional concerns, a
suit charging that a supervisor made a mistake directly related to a particular trial. . . and a
suit charginp that a supervisor trained and supervised inadequately ... would seem very
much alike.
In other words, like trial prosecutors, supervisory prosecutors should be able to make
decisions relating to trial advocacy free of the fear of personal liability. The Court was
also concerned that it may often prove difficult to draw a line between general office
supervision or training, e.g., relating to Brady material, and "specific supervision or
training related to a particular case." 20 7
The Court saw no reason to distinguish between the trial prosecutor and
supervisory prosecutor. The training, supervision, and information-management claims
204. Id. at 862.
205. Van De Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 862 (emphasis in original).
206. Id. at 862-863.
207. Id. at 863.
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in Van de Kamp rested on the direct Brady error by the trial prosecutor.208 In the Court's
view, just as the individual prosecutor should be able to make decisions free of the fear
of personal liability, so too should supervisory prosecutors. The Court found that
[t]o permit this suit to go forward would create practical anomalies. A trial prosecutor
would remain immune, even for intentionally failing to turn over, say Giglio
[impeachment] material; but her supervisor might be liable for negligent training or
supervision. Small prosecution offices where supervisors can personally participate in all
of the cases would likewise remain immune from prosecution; but large offices, making
use of more general office-wide supervision and training, would not.209
The Court had no trouble seeing through the plaintiffs strategy. It made clear that
it will not allow § 1983 plaintiffs' attorneys to work an end run around prosecutorial
immunity, because "the ease with which a plaintiff could restyle a complaint charging a
trial failure so that it becomes a complaint charging a failure of training or supervision
would eviscerate Imbler."2 10
The Court's rationale for applying absolute immunity to plaintiffs training and
supervision claims also applied to his information-system claim, even if that claim was
even more "purely administrative" in nature. "Deciding what to include and what not to
include in an information system is little different from making similar decisions in
respect to training" in that each process requires knowledge of the law.2 11
This type of information system would require courts to determine whether there is
a need for an information-system, if so, what kind of system, "and whether an
appropriate system would have included Giglio-related information about one particular
kind of trial informant."212 These decisions, too, are intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process. "Consequently, where a § 1983 plaintiff claims
that a prosecutor's management of a trial-related information system is responsible for a
constitutional error at his or her particular trial, the prosecutor responsible for the system
enjoys absolute immunity just as would the prosecutor who handled the particular trial
itself."2 13
The upshot of Van de Kamp is that characterizations of a prosecutor's actions as
"administrative" will not necessarily negate prosecutorial immunity. This appears to be
the first time that the Supreme Court has characterized a prosecutor's conduct as
"administrative," yet applied absolute immunity.214
208. Id. at 857, 863 (defendants' management tasks at issue are "directly connected with the prosecutor's
basic trial advocacy duties"; plaintiff's claims rest "in necessary part upon a consequent error by an individual
prosecutor in the midst of trial").
209. Id. at 863 (emphasis in original).
210. Van De Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 863.
211. Id. at 864.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 864-865.
214. Id. at 862. Prior to the decision in Van de Kamp, some lower courts held that the formulation of
prosecutorial policies was shielded by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245,
1269 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for prosecuting an individual under a
policy of pursuing criminal charges against individuals who refuse to waive civil suits against police officers
for false arrest) ("The decision to focus prosecutorial energies upon particular classes of law violations or
violators clearly bears many features in common with a decision to commence a single proceeding."); Whitfield
v. City of Phila., 587 F. Supp. 2d 657, 671 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune
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B. Qualified Immunity
Officials sued under § 1983 in their personal capacities for money damages for
carrying out executive and administrative functions may assert the defense of qualified
immunity.215 This defense protects officials who acted in an objectively reasonable
manner. An official who violated the plaintiff's federally protected rights, but not clearly
established federal law, acted in an objectively reasonable manner and will be shielded
from personal liability.216 Conversely, an official who not only violated the plaintiffs
federally protected rights, but in so doing violated clearly established federal law, did not
act in an objectively reasonable manner and will not be protected from personal
liability. 2 17
Qualified immunity is the most important defense in § 1983 litigation. For one
thing, it is very frequently asserted in defense of § 1983 damages claims. The
voluminous § 1983 claims against law enforcement officers asserting unconstitutional
arrests, searches, and use of force are subject to qualified immunity.218 Then, too, a
fairly high percentage of § 1983 claims are resolved in favor of defendant officials on the
basis of qualified immunity. Furthermore, qualified immunity is not just an immunity
from liability, but also an "immunity from suit," meaning that the defendant is immune
from the burdens of having to defend the suit, including the burdens of discovery. 2 19
1. "Clearly Established Federal Law"
The Supreme Court applied the qualified immunity defense in Redding.220 The
§ 1983 complaint alleged that a strip search of a female middle school student violated
the Fourth Amendment. The defendants included three school officials sued for damages
in their personal capacities. The Supreme Court held that although the school officials'
strip search violated the Fourth Amendment,221 the officials were protected by qualified
immunity because there was "reason to question the clarity with which the right was
from employing a policy or custom of appealing vacaturs of sentences entered on technical procedural grounds
because such a policy "is virtually indistinguishable from the decision to appeal the vacatur in [this] case
alone"); Eisenberg v. D.A. for Co. of Kings, 847 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. N.Y. 1994) (holding that a District
Attorney's alleged policy of prosecuting sex crimes despite lack of supporting evidence was shielded by
absolute immunity, that there is no meaningful distinction between formulating policy to prosecute a particular
type of crime and prosecuting an individual for that crime, and that merely characterizing a District Attorney's
decision as "policy" does not deprive it of absolute immunity).
215. See e.g. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. 808; Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S.
551 (2004); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991); Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335 (1986).
216. See e.g. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 801 (1982).
217. See e.g. Groh, 540 U.S. at 552; Hope, 536 U.S. at 731. In Pearson, discussed infra nn. 240-264, the
Court quoted Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in Grohin dictum, that "[t]he protection of qualified
immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is a 'mistake of law, a mistake of fact,
or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.' " Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815 (quoting Groh, 540 U.S. at
567 (Kennedy, J. dissenting)). This position is contrary to the Court's holding in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
205 (2001), that qualified immunity protects officials from reasonable errors of law, not from errors of fact.
218. See e.g. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 809; Brosseau, 543 U.S. 194; Groh, 540 U.S. 551; Saucier, 533 U.S.
194; Malley, 475 U.S. 335.
219. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); accord lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953; Saucier, 533 U.S. at
200-201.
220. 129 S. Ct. 2633.
221. Infra pt. II(B).
2612009
31
Schwartz: Supreme Court Section 1983 Decisions - October 2008 Term
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2009
TULSA LAW REVIEW
established . . . .,222
The Court acknowledged that federal law can be clearly established even in the
absence of controlling precedent because, as Judge Posner stated, the "easiest cases"
involving the most outrageous official conduct do not always arise. 22 3 However, even if
conduct is not outrageous, officials are not protected by qualified immunity when, even
in novel circumstances, federal law puts them on notice that their conduct violates
clearly established constitutional principles. 224
In Redding there was circuit court authority on the Fourth Amendment issue, but it
reflected a divergence, rather than a consensus, of opinion.225 Differences of opinion
among circuit court judges around the country were "substantial enough" to convince the
Supreme Court to grant qualified "immunity for the school officials in this case . . . .
[C]ases viewing school strip searches differently from the way [the Supreme Court
views] them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and dissenting opinions,
to counsel doubt that [the Court was] sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law." 226
The Court cautioned, however, that qualified immunity is not always "the guaranteed
product of disuniform views of the law in the other federal, or state, courts, and the fact
that a single judge, or even a group of judges, disagrees about the contours of a right
does not automatically render the law unclear if [the Court has] been clear." 227
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, in their separate dissents on the qualified immunity
issue, found that the school officials should not be protected by qualified immunity
because they violated clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. 228 In
their view, the strip search violated the principles clearly established by T.L.O.229 and
"the clarity of a well-established right should not depend on whether [circuit court]
jurists have misread our precedents."230 It did not take a "constitutional scholar" to
figure out that the search was unconstitutional.231 According to Justice Thomas,
dissenting, the defendant officials were protected by qualified immunity because the
search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.232 The decision in Redding thus illustrates
that there can be difficulty determining whether federal law was clearly established for
purposes of qualified immunity. Eight justices found that the strip search violated the
Fourth Amendment, but of those, six found that the federal law was not clearly
established while two justices found otherwise. One justice found no Fourth Amendment
violation at all.
222. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2637-2638.
223. Id at 2643 (quoting K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990)).
224. Id. (relying on Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).
225. Id. at 2643-2644 (citing circuit court authorities).
226. Id. at 2644.
227. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644.
228. Id. at 2644-2646. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined in each other's opinion, concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part.
229. 469 U.S. 325, 333-337 (1985).
230. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2645 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231. Id. at 2644 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 382 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (in
turn quoting Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.3d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980))).
232. Id. at 2655.
262 Vol. 45:231
32
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 45 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss2/3
SUPREME COURT§ 1983 DECISIONS
2. Procedural Aspects of Qualified Immunity
A voluminous body of Supreme Court and lower court decisional law has
developed over the myriad facets of qualified immunity.233 Many of the issues are
procedural in nature. 234 Last term the Supreme Court rendered rulings concerning three
important procedural aspects of qualified immunity: (1) complaint pleading requirements
for claims subject to qualified immunity; (2) the decision-making methodology for
qualified immunity, specifically whether a court must first determine whether the
complaint states a violation of a federally protected right; and (3) the scope of the
defendant's right to take an immediate appeal from a district court's denial of qualified
immunity.
a. Pleading Requirements
In 1993, the Supreme Court in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit 235 held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)'s
"notice" pleading standard governs § 1983 municipal liability claims but left open
whether a "heightened" pleading standard applies to § 1983 personal-capacity claims
subject to qualified immunity.2 36 The Leatherman Court's reservation of this issue
created uncertainty about a plaintiffs pleading burden when a § 1983 damages claim is
subject to qualified immunity. Although the great majority of the circuits applied the
"notice" pleading standard,237 some courts, most notably the Eleventh Circuit, imposed a
heightened pleading rule.23 8
The Supreme Court's decision in Twombly239 generated added uncertainty and
confusion. In Twombly, an antitrust case, the Court ruled that although Rule 8 notice
pleading does not require "detailed factual allegations[J" 240 the complaint must plead
more than labels and conclusions and must support the claims asserted with factual
allegations. These "[fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level" to a "plausibility" level.241 It was unclear, however, whether the
new Twombly pleading plausibility standard was specifically designed for anti-trust
cases, or whether it was intended to apply to civil actions generally.
As discussed earlier,242 the Supreme Court in Iqbal held that the Twombly
pleading standards apply to all federal court civil complaints, thus encompassing
complaints filed under § 1983 and the Bivens doctrine.243 Because the only claims
before the Supreme Court in Iqbal were personal-capacity damages claims the
233. See Schwartz, supra n. 61, at vol. 1(A), ch. 9(A).
234. Id.
235. 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993).
236. Id. at 166-167.
237. See Martin A. Schwartz & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Section 1983 Litigation 10 (2d ed., Fed. Jud. Ctr. 2008)
(available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdfnsf/lookup/sec 19832.pdf/$file/sec19832.pdf).
238. GJR Invs., Inc. v. Co. ofEscambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998).
239. 550 U.S. 544,
240. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
241. Id. (quoting Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 5, § 1216,
(3d ed., West 2004)).
242. See supra pt. I.
243. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
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defendants sought to dismiss under qualified immunity, the Court's decision in Iqbal
effectively holds that the Twombly plausibility pleading standard governs § 1983 claims
subject to qualified immunity. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Iqbal did not even
mention the possibility that these claims might be subject to a heightened pleading
standard.
The Twombly plausibility pleading standard seems to lie somewhere between the
rather "bare bones" notice pleading standard that generally pertained pre-Twombly and a
heightened pleading standard. So viewed, Iqbal reflects a compromise between the
advocates of notice pleading and heightened pleading for claims subject to qualified
immunity.
b. Qualfied Immunity Decision-making Protocol
Last term, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme Court, in an unanimous opinion by
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., held that when qualified immunity is asserted as a defense, a
court has the discretion to first decide whether the complaint asserts a violation of a
federally protected right or to proceed directly to the qualified immunity issue of whether
the defendant violated clearly established federal law.244 Prior to the decision in
Pearson, the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz had mandated a two step protocol for
deciding qualified immunity which required a court to first decide whether the complaint
stated a violation of a federally protected right.245 A determination in a defendant's favor
on that issue would entitle the defendant to judgment as a matter of law. However, if the
court found for the plaintiff on this issue, it would then have to decide if the federal right
was clearly established. The Court in Pearson overruled Saucier and gave the courts
discretion over the sequencing of issues. In the author's view, the decision in Pearson is
likely to have a major impact on the qualified immunity decision making process.
To be sure, adherence to the Saucier requirement that courts first decide whether
the complaint states a violation of a federally protected right has its advantages. Most
significantly, this methodology promotes the development and clarification of federal
constitutional standards. This is especially so for constitutional issues not likely to arise
outside the § 1983 damages qualified immunity context, such as in injunction actions and
criminal prosecutions. As the Court in Pearson put it, "the Saucier Court was certainly
correct in noting that the two-step procedure promotes the development of constitutional
precedent and is especially valuable with respect to questions that do not frequently arise
in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable." 246 In addition, there are
cases in which it may be "difficult to decide whether a right is clearly established without
first deciding precisely what the constitutional right happens to be."247
On the other hand, like most inflexible mandatory rules, adherence to the Saucier
methodology did not always make sense. Take a case like Pearson which presented a
difficult unresolved Fourth Amendment issue, namely, whether a home resident's
consent which allows an undercover agent to enter the premises carries with it consent
244. 129 S. Ct. at 818.
245. 533 U.S. at 207.
246. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
247. Id. (quoting Lyons v. Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 581 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring)).
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for back-up police officers to enter as well, under what some courts term the "consent
once removed" doctrine. This doctrine, however, has never been sanctioned by the U.S.
Supreme Court and is not universally recognized by the lower courts. Under these
circumstances, absent binding circuit court precedent, the one thing that was clear is that
when the police entered the premises the Fourth Amendment law was not clearly
established. In other words, it was clear that the federal law was unclear. In these
circumstances, which are not uncommon, there is a strong argument that, absent some
special circumstance, a lower court should not have to struggle with the constitutional
merits when it can easily conclude that the federal law was not clearly established. 248
The inflexible rigidity of the Saucier two-step dance provoked rather vigorous
opposition. Several Justices of the Supreme Court voiced their criticism249 as did some
circuit court judges who, having "had the task of applying the Saucier rule on a regular
basis for the past eight years, [were not] reticent in their criticism of Saucier's 'rigid
order of battle.' "250 Second Circuit Judge Pierre Leval was the most forceful critic.251
The expectation in § 1983 circles was that at some point the Supreme Court would
reexamine the rigid Saucier methodology. Sure enough, on March 29, 2008, the Supreme
Court in Pearson, when granting the defendant officers' petition for certiorari, directed
the parties to brief and argue whether Saucier should be overruled. 2 52
There were major indicators at the oral argument in Pearson that Saucier had seen
better days. For one thing, the Justices were struggling with the merits of the plaintiffs
Fourth Amendment claim that consent to the undercover agent did not extend to the
other officers. Chief Justice John Roberts stated that when he was a circuit court judge he
thought it was very odd that I had to go and decide a difficult constitutional issue and then
not worry about it because in one sentence you say well, but the issue is not clearly
established and so it's qualified immunity.
[I]n my experience it was unworkable, or at least frustrating, in that we had to decide ... a
253
constitutional question where it wasn't necessary.
He suggested that when a court rules for the defendant because the law was not clearly
established, the court's ruling on the constitutional merits is "purely an advisory
opinion . . . ." 254 Justice Breyer, too, questioned why courts shouldn't be able to take the
"easier path" by proceeding directly to the "clearly established" law issue.255
So, it did not exactly come as a shock when the Court in Pearson overturned
Saucier and held "that the Saucier protocol should not be regarded as mandatory in all
cases . . . ."256 The criticism of the mandatory protocol by Supreme Court Justices and
248. Id.
249. Id. at 817-818 (citing various authorities).
250. Id. at 817.
251. See Pierre Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1275-
1277 (2006) (cited in Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 817).
252. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 1702.
253. Oral Argument at 36, Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 808 (available at 2008 WL 4565749).
254. Id at 25.
255. Id. at 23-25.
256. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
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circuit court judges provided the justification for overturning the Saucier precedent and
thus not adhering to stare decisis. At the same time, the Court in Pearson acknowledged
that following the Saucier methodology "is often beneficial[,]"257 that its "decision [in
Pearson] does not prevent the lower courts from following the Saucier procedure; it
simply recognizes that those courts should have the discretion to decide whether that
procedure is worthwhile in particular cases." 2 58
The Court detailed several circumstances in which it may make sense for a court to
bypass the "constitutional merits" step and proceed directly to the "clearly established"
law issue.
1. Where "it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far
from obvious whether in fact there is such a right;" 259
2. Where "the constitutional question is so fact-bound that the decision provides
little guidance for future cases;" 260
3. Where it is likely that the constitutional question will soon be decided by a
higher court or by an en banc court;2 61
4. Where the constitutional decision rests "on an uncertain interpretation of state
law[]" rendering the constitutional ruling "of doubtful precedential importance;"262 and
5. Where "qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage, [and] the precise
factual basis for the plaintiff s claim .. . may be hard to identify." 263
Furthermore, as a general proposition, following the Saucier two-step dance runs
counter to Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority's264 principle of judicial self-
restraint that federal courts decide federal constitutional issues only when necessary, that
is, as a last resort rather than as a first resort. 265 The Court in Pearson was confident that
deviation from the Saucier methodology would not leave significant numbers of
constitutional issues unresolved. "Most" constitutional issues that are presented in
§ 1983 actions subject to qualified immunity are also likely to arise in other types of
actions, such as criminal cases, § 1983 municipal liability actions, and § 1983 suits for
injunctive relief.266
How is Pearson likely to impact the adjudication and litigation of qualified
immunity? Under the Saucier regime, courts were mandated to adhere to the two-step
protocol. Armed with this knowledge, the attorneys for the parties knew that they had to
brief and be prepared to orally argue both Saucier steps, the constitutional merits and the
clearly established federal law issue. That certainty was one of the virtues of the
mandatory approach. By contrast, under Pearson, a court has discretion whether to
257. Id.
258. Id. at 821.
259. Id. at 818.
260. Id. at 819.
261. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 819.
262. Id. at 819.
263. Id.
264. 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
265. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 821; see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009); N. Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009).
266. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 821-822. The Court in Pearson did "not think that relaxation of Saucier's
mandate is likely to result in a proliferation of damages claims against local governments." Id. at 822.
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follow or deviate from the Saucier methodology. Because a court may choose to follow
the two-step approach, the attorneys should, as they would pre-Pearson, brief both issues
and be prepared to argue both, even though the court may decide to bypass the first step
and proceed directly to the clearly established federal law issue.
Under Pearson, counsel for the parties may choose to convince the court as to how
it should exercise its discretion over whether or not to follow the two-step approach.
Plaintiffs generally favor the two-step approach because resolution of the constitutional
merits in the plaintiff's favor may enhance the likelihood of the court also rejecting the
qualified immunity defense. Then, too, the two-step approach promotes the development
of constitutional standards, thereby enhancing the likelihood of plaintiffs being able to
overcome qualified immunity in future cases. By contrast, defendants generally prefer
that courts proceed directly to the "clearly established" qualified immunity issue,
because this approach both enhances the likelihood of prevailing under qualified
immunity in the case at hand and slows the judicial process of establishing constitutional
norms. Nevertheless, the Pearson Court thought it unlikely that its decision will result in
a "new cottage industry of litigation" over the standards for exercising this discretion.267
Only time will tell whether or not a new "cottage industry" will in fact evolve.
The Supreme Court in Pearson decided to bypass the constitutional merits issue
and, on the clearly established issue, had no difficulty ruling for the defendant officers.
The Court found that lower court decisional law adopting the "consent-once-removed"
doctrine demonstrated that the defendant officers' reliance upon the doctrine was not
unreasonable, even though their own circuit (the Tenth) had not yet passed on the issue
when defendants conducted their search. The Court reasoned that because "the
divergence of views on the consent-once-removed doctrine was created by the decision
of the [Tenth Circuit] Court of Appeals in this case, it is improper to subject [defendants]
to money damages for their conduct." 2 68
c. Qualified Immunity Appeals
Normally, only final decisions of the federal district courts are appealable to the
court of appeals.269 However, it has been settled since 1985 that, pursuant to the Cohen
collateral order doctrine,270 a district court order denying a defendant officer qualified
immunity on a motion for summary judgment may be immediately appealed.271 The
rationale of allowing an immediate appeal is that, because qualified immunity is both a
defense to liability and an "entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of
litigation," the immunity would be effectively lost if a district court erroneously denied
qualified immunity and the defendant was subjected to the burdens of litigation. 272 In
267. Id. (citation omitted).
268. Id. at 823.
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2009).
270. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Under the collateral order doctrine a
non-final district court order is immediately appealable when the order finally determines an issue separable
from, and collateral to the rights asserted in the action, the issue is too important to be denied review, "and too
independent of the cause . .. [to] be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id.
271. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-527.
272. Id. at 526.
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other words, the denial of qualified immunity is "effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment." 2 73
However, and this is an important proviso, the defendant has the right to take an
immediate appeal from the denial of qualified immunity only when the immunity
defense "turns on an issue of law . . . ."274 The rationale for this limitation is that the
circuit courts should not, on interlocutory appeal, have to fine comb through a "vast
pretrial record, with numerous conflicting affidavits, depositions, and other discovery
materials."275 "That process generally involves matters more within a district court's ken
and may replicate inefficiently questions that will arise on appeal following final
judgment." 276
In Iqbal, the defendant supervisory officials moved to dismiss the plaintiffs Bivens
claims on the basis of qualified immunity because, they argued, the complaint failed "to
state sufficient allegations to show their own involvement in clearly established
unconstitutional conduct."277 The district court denied the motion and, on defendants'
interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.278 In the United
States Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that although the court of appeals had
"jurisdiction to determine whether his complaint avers a clearly established
constitutional violation[,] ... it lacked jurisdiction to pass on the [factual] sufficiency of
[the] pleadings."2 79
The Supreme Court had little difficulty rejecting plaintiff's argument. Although the
justices divided 5-4 on the merits, none of the justices agreed with plaintiff that the
defendant did not have the right to an immediate appeal. The Court relied in part upon its
ruling in Behrens v. Pelletier that a district court order denying qualified immunity is
immediately appealable.280 This makes sense because in these circumstances the
immunity appeal presents a pure issue of law within the expertise of the circuit court,
namely, whether, assuming the factual allegations of the complaint to be true, the
allegations state a violation of clearly established federal law.281 It is not a big leap to
conclude that a court of appeals has jurisdiction on interlocutory immunity appeal to
decide whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts to constitute a violation of clearly
established federal law. This, too, is a pure question of law within the expertise of the
court of appeals. As the Supreme Court put it, whether the "complaint has the 'heft' to
state a claim is a task well within an appellate court's core competency." 282
273. Id. at 527.
274. Id. at 530; accord Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-320 (1995).
275. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316.
276. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947 (citing Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316).
277. Id. at 1944.
278. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 147.
279. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1946.
280. 516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996); see Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947.
281. See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 435-436 (2d Cir. 2004).
282. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 597).
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IV. SUPERVISORY LIABILiTY
As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court in Iqbal made important rulings
concerning civil lights pleadings and qualified immunity. The Court made another highly
significant ruling, namely, its unexpected knockout blow rejecting supervisory liability
for § 1983 and Bivens claims. This was unexpected both because (1) the defendant
supervisory officials conceded that they would be subject to supervisory liability if they
had "actual knowledge" of subordinates' unconstitutional discrimination conduct and
were "deliberately indifferent to that discrimination[,]" 283 and (2) because there was "no
briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory liability .... 284
Prior to its decision in Iqbal, the Supreme Court had not resolved the question of
the liability of supervisory officers for constitutional violations committed directly by
subordinate employees, either in § 1983 or in Bivens actions.285 The Court had resolved
in its landmark decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services286 that although
municipalities are subject to § 1983 liability, there is no vicarious liability under § 1983.
In other words, a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 simply because it
employed a constitutional wrongdoer. This means that each § 1983 defendant may be
held liable only for his, her, or its own conduct that was the proximate cause of the
violation of the plaintiffs federally protected rights. 287 In the context of § 1983
municipal liability, this means that a municipal entity may be held liable under § 1983
only when the violation of plaintiffs federally protected rights can be attributable to
enforcement of a municipal policy, practice, or decision of a final municipal
policymaker. In other words, "it is when execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983."288 In fact, a highly complex body of Supreme Court and lower court
decisional law has evolved attempting to flesh out the types of municipal policies and
culpability that warrants the imposition of § 1983 municipal liability. 289 This led Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, to criticize the "highly
complex body of interpretive law" that has developed attempting to maintain and
perpetuate the distinction between direct and vicarious liability and called for
reexamination of "the legal soundness of that basic distinction itself."
290
Although municipal liability is a form of entity liability, a supervisor's liability is a
form of personal liability. A common thread for municipal and supervisor liability is that
in each case the plaintiff normally attempts to hold the defendant liable for the
283. Id. at 1956 (quoting Br. for Pet. at 50) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1954-1955.
284. Id. at 1957.
285. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Here, the Court's decision is ambiguous as to whether
supervisory liability was at issue. Schwartz, supra n. 61, at ch. 7. The Court in Iqbal did not refer to Rizzo.
286. 436 U.S. 658.
287. There is a proximate cause element in § 1983 actions. See Schwartz, supra n. 61, at § 6.03; see e.g.
Martinez v. Cal., 444 U.S. 277, 284-285 (1980).
288. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
289. See Schwartz, supra n. 61, at ch. 7.
290. Bd. of Co. Commrs. of Bryan Co., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430-431 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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constitutional wrongs directly committed by subordinate officials. And, so, it was not
surprising that the circuit courts, when faced with § 1983 supervisory liability claims,
would borrow and analogize from the law of § 1983 municipal liability. In fact, in
§ 1983 actions, a fairly extensive body of decisional law developed in the circuits which
formulated a variety of culpability standards for supervisory liability claims.29 1 Although
the standards differed somewhat from circuit to circuit, the circuits were fairly consistent
in holding that a supervisor may be held liable for a subordinate's unconstitutional
conduct if the plaintiff demonstrated that the supervisory defendant either acquiesced in
or was deliberately indifferent to the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct and that the
supervisor's action or inaction was "affirmatively linked" to the deprivation of plaintiffs
federal rights.292
The plaintiff in Iqbal asserted two different theories of supervisory liability. First,
he alleged that defendants Ashcroft and Mueller adopted a policy calling for harsh
treatment of post 9/11 detainees based upon their religion, race, and/or national origin.
The Court ruled that this claim did not allege a plausible claim, both because it was
conclusory and because there was a more plausible explanation for defendants' adoption
of the alleged policy, namely, that it was adopted for national security reasons rather than
for discriminating reasons. 293
The plaintiff in Iqbal also argued that "under a theory of 'supervisory liability'
[defendants] can be liable for 'knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates' use of
discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions among detainees." 294 In other
words "a supervisor's mere knowledge of his subordinate's discriminatory purpose
amounts to the supervisor's violating the Constitution."295 The Court emphatically
"reject[ed] this argument." 296
The Supreme Court, without so much as referring to the extensive circuit court
authority, jettisoned the very concept of supervisory liability and held that a supervisor
may be found liable under § 1983 or Bivens only when it is shown that the supervisor
himself or herself engaged in unconstitutional conduct. In Iqbal, this would require a
showing that the supervisor adopted a policy, or directed action by a subordinate, with
the constitutionally impermissible discriminatory intent alleged by the defendant, or
otherwise set the wheels in motion that caused the violation of plaintiffs constitutional
rights. The Court, however, rejected the very concept of supervisory liability. The Court
reasoned that because there is no vicarious liability under § 1983 or Bivens,
"supervisory liability" is a misnomer. [E]ach Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. In the context of determining
whether there is a violation of clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity,
[discriminatory] purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on
the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official
291. See Schwartz, supra n. 61, at § 7.19.
292. See Schwartz & Urbonya, supra n. 237, at 120.
293. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
294. Id. at 1949 (quoting Br. for Respt. Javaid Iqbal at 45-46, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (available at 2008 WL
4734962)).
295. Id.
296. Id.
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charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities.297
Thus, defendants Ashcroft and Mueller "cannot be held liable unless they
themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic."298 This is
likely to lead to a new wave of § 1983 decisional law in which courts determine when
official conduct of supervisors is itself unconstitutional. Like other officials, supervisors
should be found liable when they set the unconstitutional wheels in motion that caused
the plaintiffs injury, even though they did not directly inflict the injury. 299
The dissent was fully cognizant of the severe implications of the Court's decision
on § 1983 supervisory liability. Justice Souter stated:
Lest there be any mistake . . . the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory
liability; it is eliminating Bivens [and § 1983] supervisory liability entirely. The nature of a
supervisory liability theory is that the supervisor may be liable, under certain conditions,
for the wrongdoing of his subordinates, and it is this very principle that the majority
rejects.
[The majority] rests on the assumption that only two outcomes are possible here:
respondeat superior liability, in which "an employer is subject to liability for torts
committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment," or no
supervisory liability at all.
In fact, there is quite a spectrum of possible tests for supervisory liability: it could be
imposed where a supervisor has actual knowledge of a subordinate's constitutional
violation and acquiesces . .. or where supervisors "know about the conduct and facilitate it,
approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see," or where the
supervisor has no actual knowledge of the violation but was reckless in his supervision of
the subordinate ... 300
Although it is possible for a dissenting opinion to mischaracterize the Court's
holding, including overstating it, the dissent in Iqbal appears to characterize the Courts
supervisory liability holding accurately. Furthermore, the dissent seemingly had no
interest in overstating the Court's holding. In the author's view, the Iqbal Court's
elimination of § 1983 supervisory liability represents a serious setback for § 1983
plaintiffs.
V. STATE COURT § 1983 ACTIONS: CLAIMS AGAINST CORRECTION OFFICERS
The great majority of § 1983 actions are filed in the federal courts. This is not
surprising since, as the Supreme Court recognizes, "[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the
297. Id. at 1949.
298. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952.
299. A federal district court, distinguishing Iqbal, found that complaint allegations against John Yoo, former
Deputy Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel under President George W. Bush, violated the
constitutional rights of the plaintiff "enemy combatant" by promulgating memoranda that constituted direct
participation in the decision to detain the plaintiff and created the legal constraint designed to justify the harsh
interrogation methods used against him. Padilla v. Yoo, N.D.Cal.No. C08-00035 JSW (June 12, 2009).
300. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957-1958 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of
state law, 'whether the action be executive, legislative, or judicial.' "301 At the same time
it is established that "§ 1983 actions may be brought in state courts" 302 because state and
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. 303 In fact, substantial
numbers of § 1983 claims are filed in the state courts on an ongoing basis. The Supreme
Court, however, has "never held that state courts must entertain § 1983 suits." 304
In Haywood v. Drown the Supreme Court held, 5-4, that New York Correction
Law § 24, which bars prison inmates from filing § 1983 claims for damages against
correction officers in their personal capacities in New York State courts, violates the
Supremacy Clause.305 New York's policy of generally allowing § 1983 claims to be
filed in its courts of general jurisdiction but barring for state policy reasons § 1983
damages claims against correction officers conflicted with § 1983's essential purpose of
providing a federal remedy for constitutional violations by state and municipal officers.
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court, which was joined by Justices
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, only
Part III of which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Alito.
New York Correction Law § 24(1) is a fairly unusual statute. It divests New
York's Supreme Courts-the State's trial courts of general jurisdiction-of authority over
§ 1983 damages claims against correction officers even though New York allows § 1983
claims to be asserted in its courts against other state officials, such as police officers. The
statute does not purport to prevent New York prisoners from seeking declaratory or
injunctive relief in state court or from suing correction officers for any type of relief in
federal court. Further, § 24(2) provides that a claim for damages based upon official
conduct by a correction officer must be brought in the New York Court of Claims "as a
claim against the state." 306 A court of claims action, however, is not equivalent to a
claim against the officer. Besides the fact that the action must be brought against the
State rather than against the official personally, plaintiffs who sue in the Court of Claims
must comply with a 90-day notice-of-claim requirement,307 are not entitled to a jury
trial, and may not recover attorney's fees, punitive damages, or injunctive relief. 308
Furthermore, plaintiffs cannot assert § 1983 claims against the state (or state entity) in
the Court of Claims because the State is not a suable "person" under § 1983.309
The New York Court of Appeals upheld Correction Law § 24 on the grounds that
it was "neutral state rule regarding the administration of [New York's] courts" and thus a
"valid excuse" for New York's refusal to hear § 1983 claims against correction
301. Mitchun v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1980))
(emphasis added); accord Patsy v. Board of Regents of State ofFla., 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982).
302. Me. v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980); accord Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at. 2114; Howlett v. Rose, 493
U.S. 356 (1990).
303. Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2114; Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
304. Nail. Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Commn., 515 U.S. 582, 587 n. 4 (1995).
305. 129 S. Ct. 2108.
306. N.Y. Correct. L. § 24(2).
307. N.Y. Ct. Claims Act § 9. Section 1983 does not have a notice-of-claim requirement. Felder v. Casey,
487 U.S. 131 (1988).
308. See Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2113.
309. Will, 491 U.S. at 66.
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officers.310 Judge Jones, dissenting, found that the State rule was not neutral because
New York trial courts hear all other § 1983 damages actions, and concluded that "once a
state opens its courts to hear Section 1983 actions, it may not selectively exclude certain
Section 1983 actions by denominating state policies as jurisdictional." 3 11 The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, rejecting New York's argument that § 24 was a mere neutral
rule of court administration and finding the New York policy in conflict with § 1983.
U.S. Supreme Court precedent established that state rules which treat federal and
state claims equally may provide a "valid excuse" for a state court's refusal to adjudicate
a federal claim 3 12 On the other hand, the "Supreme Court has suggested repeatedly that
state courts may not discriminate against federal causes of action." 3 13 New York
Correction Law § 24 does not discriminate against § 1983 claims; it treats them equally
in that it bars all claims for damages against correction officers, whether based upon
state or federal law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that § 24 violated the
Supremacy Clause because it frustrated the policies of § 1983. The Court stated that, to
the extent that its decisions created a "misconception" that state law treating federal and
state claims equally will be upheld,
we now make clear that equality of treatment does not ensure that a state law will be
deemed a neutral rule of judicial administration and therefore a valid excuse for refusing to
entertain a federal cause of action.
Although the absence of discrimination is necessary to our finding a state law neutral,
it is not sufficient. A jurisdictional rule cannot be used as a device to undermine federal
law, no matter how evenhanded it may appear ... . Ensuring equality of treatment is thus
the beginning, not the end, of the Supremacy Clause analysis.
New York's refusal to allow § 1983 suits against correction officers was based on
the State's belief that these suits are "too numerous or too frivolous (or both)" 3 15 New
York's policy, however, "is contrary to Congress' judgment that all persons who violate
federal rights while acting under color of state law shall be held liable for damages." 3 16
In other words, a state may not simply assume that a whole category of § 1983 claims is
frivolous, but must determine the merits of the claims on a case-by-case basis.317
The mere fact that New York considers and labels § 24 "jurisdictional" did not
shield the state statute from Supremacy Clause scrutiny. 3 18 In fact, because New York's
Supreme Courts generally have personal jurisdiction in § 1983 actions and "hear the
310. Haywood v. Drown, 9 N.Y. 3d 481, 487 (2007).
311. Id. at 497 (Jones, J. dissenting).
312. See e.g. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Douglas v. N.Y, 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
313. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Henry M. Hart, Herber Wechsler, Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart
and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 447 (5th ed., Foundation Press 2003); see e.g.
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Rey, 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Mondou v. N.Y,
N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
314. Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2116.
315. Id. at 2115.
316. Id.
317. "A State may not ... relieve congestion in its courts by declaring a whole category of federal claims to
be frivolous. Until it has been proved that the [particular] claim has no merit, that judgment is not up to the
States to make." Id. at 2115 (quoting Howlett, 496 U.S. at 380).
318. Id. 129 S. Ct. at 2114-2118.
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lion's share of all other § 1983 actions," § 24 did not implicate essential concerns of
either in personam or subject matter jurisdiction.319 Rather, § 24 "is effectively an
immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb." 320 And, as an immunity statute, § 24
violates the related principles established in Howlett v. Rose that (1) the elements of and
defenses to the § 1983 claim for relief are defined by federal law, and, therefore, (2) state
law may not expand immunity from § 1983 liability beyond the immunities authorized
by federal law. 32 1
The Court said that it was only addressing New York's "unique scheme" shielding
particular defendants (correction officers) from particular liability (damages) brought by
particular plaintiffs (prisoners).322 Nevertheless, in the author's view, the decision in
Haywood supports the broader principle that once a state grants its state courts
jurisdiction to hear § 1983 claims, it cannot pick and choose, allowing them to hear some
categories of § 1983 claims but not others, and the mere fact the state labels its policy
"jurisdictional" does not call for a different result. As the Court couched its holding,
New York, having created courts of general jurisdiction that regularly hear § 1983 suits
against other officers, may not "shut the courthouse door to federal claims that it
considers at odds with its local policy." 323
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion paints with a very broad textualistic,
federalism brush. He advanced the view that under the Constitution the states have
"unfettered authority" to determine whether a state's courts may hear a federal claim for
relief.3 24 Fortunately, no other Justice joined this position. As for the Supremacy Clause,
Justice Thomas again, speaking only for himself, opined that its "exclusive function is to
disable state laws that are substantively inconsistent with federal law-not to require state
courts to hear federal claims over which the [state] courts lack jurisdiction."325 Under
these principles, of course, Correction Law § 24 would clearly be constitutional. The
majority, however, while acknowledging that a "State's authority to organize its courts
[is] considerable,"326 found that the Constitution does impose limitations on that
authority, specifically in the Supremacy Clause principle that a state law may not burden
or frustrate a federal claim for relief.327 Furthermore, Justice Thomas disagreed with
Supreme Court precedent holding that states may not discriminate against federal claims,
stating that "[i]n the end, of course, 'the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the
319. Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2117, 2137; see also id. at 2118 n. 9 (state may not refuse to hear a federal
claim simply by calling its rule "jurisdictional").
320. Id.at2ll8.
321. 496 U.S. 356; see also Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2115 n. 5.
322. Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2118. Because New York generally authorizes its court to hear § 1983 claims,
the Court was not required to decide the broader question of whether Congress may require a state to hear
§ 1983 claims. Id. at 2116.
323. Id. at 2117 (footnote omitted) (pt. IV); see also id. at 2137 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (pt. M of dissent).
324. Id. at 2122 (pt. I of dissent).
325. Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2124.
326. Id. at 2117 (majority).
327. See e.g. Felder, 487 U.S. 131 (holding that a state court § 1983 claim need not satisfy a state law notice-
of-claim requirement because the state rule creates an "unnecessary burden" that interferes with and frustrates
the federal § 1983 claim for relief. Justice Thomas's dissent in Haywood expressed disagreement with the
approach in Felder. Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2137 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (pt. II(B) of dissent).
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Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.' "328 Finally, in Part III of his
dissent, which articulates a more moderate position and in which the Chief Justice and
Justices Scalia and Alito joined, Justice Thomas reasoned that even assuming the validity
of the non-discrimination principle, Correction Law § 24 is a jurisdictional rule that
evenhandedly deprives New York courts of jurisdiction over state and federal claims for
damages by inmates against correction officers. To the majority, however, neither non-
discrimination nor the jurisdictional label marked the end of the analysis. Rather, the
critical point was that New York's policy of prohibiting constitutional claims for
damages against correction officers was inconsistent with § 1983's authorization of such
claims.
Although the decision in Haywood is strictly limited to the invalidation of New
York Correction Law § 24, the decision appears to support a broader principle. The
essential principle of the Court's decision is that once a state agrees to allow § 1983
claims to be asserted in its state courts, under the Supremacy Clause the state cannot
preclude a subset of § 1983 claims on the grounds that the state finds them at odds with
state policy.
CONCLUSION
The Court decided an unusual number of § 1983 issues during the October, 2008
term. Although plaintiffs prevailed on some issues, such as the holding that Title IX does
not preclude § 1983 constitutional claims, imposing limitations on student and motor
vehicle searches, and striking down New York's prohibition against state court § 1983
suits against correction officers, defendants prevailed on the important issues. The Court
substantially tightened § 1983 pleading requirements, rejected due process claims to
postconviction DNA testing, fortified prosecutorial immunity, vigilently applied
qualified immunity, and rejected the doctrine of supervisory liability.
328. Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2131 (quoting Graves v. N.Y ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-492 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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